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Abstract. After a brief flirtation with logicism in 1917–1920, David Hilbert proposed his
own program in the foundations of mathematics in 1920 and developed it, in concert with
collaborators such as Paul Bernays and Wilhelm Ackermann, throughout the 1920s. The two
technical pillars of the project were the development of axiomatic systems for ever stronger
and more comprehensive areas of mathematics and finitistic proofs of consistency of these
systems. Early advances in these areas were made by Hilbert (and Bernays) in a series of
lecture courses at the University of Go¨ttingen between 1917 and 1923, and notably in Ack-
ermann’s dissertation of 1924. The main innovation was the invention of the ε-calculus, on
which Hilbert’s axiom systems were based, and the development of the ε-substitution method
as a basis for consistency proofs. The paper traces the development of the “simultaneous
development of logic and mathematics” through the ε-notation and provides an analysis of
Ackermann’s consistency proofs for primitive recursive arithmetic and for the first compre-
hensive mathematical system, the latter using the substitution method. It is striking that these
proofs use transfinite induction not dissimilar to that used in Gentzen’s later consistency
proof as well as non-primitive recursive definitions, and that these methods were accepted
as finitistic at the time.
1. Introduction
Hilbert first presented his philosophical ideas based on the axiomatic method
and consistency proofs in the years 1904 and 1905, following his exchange
with Frege on the nature of axiomatic systems and the publication of Russell’s
Paradox. In the text of Hilbert’s address to the International Congress of
Mathematicians in Heidelberg, we read:
Arithmetic is often considered to be part of logic, and the traditional
fundamental logical notions are usually presupposed when it is a question
of establishing a foundation of arithmetic. If we observe attentively,
however, we realize that in the traditional exposition of the laws of logic
certain fundamental arithmetic notions are already used, for example,
the notion of set and, to some extent, also that of number. Thus we
find ourselves turning in a circle, and that is why a partly simultaneous
development of the laws of logic and arithmetic is required if paradoxes
are to be avoided.1
When Hilbert returned to his foundational work with full force in 1917, he
seems at first to have been impressed with Russell’s and Whiteheads’s work
in the Principia, which succeeded in developing large parts of mathematics
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2without using sets. By 1920, however, Hilbert returned to his earlier conviction
that a reduction of mathematics to logic is not likely to succeed. Instead, he
takes Zermelo’s axiomatic set theory as a suitable framework for developing
mathematics. He localizes the failure of Russell’s logicism in its inability to
provide the existence results necessary for analysis:
The axiomatic method used by Zermelo is unimpeachable and indispensable.
The question whether the axioms include a contradiction, however, remains
open. Furthermore the question poses itself if and in how far this axiom
system can be deduced from logic. [. . . T]he attempt to reduce set theory
to logic seems promising because sets, which are the objects of Zermelo’s
axiomatics, are closely related to the predicates of logic. Specifically,
sets can be reduced to predicates.
This idea is the starting point for Frege’s, Russell’s, and Weyl’s investigations
into the foundations of mathematics.2
The logicist project runs into a difficulty when, given a second-order predicate
S to which a set of sets is reduced, we want to know that there is a predicate to
which the union of the sets reduces. This predicate would be (∃P)(P(x)&S(P))—
x is in the union of the sets in S if there is a set P of which x is a member and
which is a member of S.
We have to ask ourselves, what “there is a predicate P” is supposed to
mean. In axiomatic set theory “there is” always refers to a basic domain
B. In logic we could also think of the predicates comprising a domain,
but this domain of predicates cannot be seen as something given at the
outset, but the predicates must be formed through logical operations,
and the rules of construction determine the domain of predicates only
afterwards.
From this we see that in the rules of logical construction of predicates
reference to the domain of predicates cannot be allowed. For otherwise
a circulus vitiosus would result.3
Here Hilbert is echoing the predicativist worries of Poincare´ and Weyl. However,
Hilbert rejects Weyl’s answer to the problem, viz., restricting mathematics to
predicatively acceptable constructions and inferences, as unacceptable in that
it amounts to “a return to the prohibition policies of Kronecker.” Russell’s
proposed solution, on the other hand, amounts to giving up the aim of reduction
to logic:
Russell starts with the idea that it suffices to replace the predicate needed
for the definition of the union set by one that is extensionally equivalent,
and which is not open to the same objections. He is unable, however,
to exhibit such a predicate, but sees it as obvious that such a predicate
exists. It is in this sense that he postulates the “axiom of reducibility,”
which states approximately the following: “For each predicate, which is
formed by referring (once or multiple times) to the domain of predicates,
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there is an extensionally equivalent predicate, which does not make such
reference.
With this, however, Russell returns from constructive logic to the
axiomatic standpoint. [. . . ]
The aim of reducing set theory, and with it the usual methods of
analysis, to logic, has not been achieved today and maybe cannot be
achieved at all.4
With this, Hilbert rejects the logicist position as failed. At the same time, he
rejects the restrictive positions of Brower, Weyl, and Kronecker. The axiomatic
method provides a framework which can accommodate the positive contributions
of Brouwer and Weyl, without destroying mathematics through a Kroneckerian
“politics of prohibitions.” For Hilbert, the unfettered progress of mathematics,
and science in general, is a prime concern. This is a position that Hilbert
had already stressed in his lectures before the 1900 and 1904 International
Congresses of Mathematics, and which is again of paramount importance for
him with the conversion of Weyl to Brouwer’s intuitionism.
Naturally, the greater freedom comes with a price attached: the axiomatic
method, in contrast to a foundation based on logical principles alone, does
not itself guarantee consistency. Thus, a proof of consistency is needed.
2. Early Consistency Proofs
Ever since his work on geometry in the 1890s, Hilbert had an interest in
consistency proofs. The approaches he used prior to the foundational program
of the 1920s were almost always relative consistency proofs. Various axiomatic
systems, from geometry to physics, were shown to be consistent by giving
arithmetical (in a broad sense, including arithmetic of the reals) interpretations
for these systems, with one exception—a prototype of a finitistic consistency
proof for a weak arithmetical system in Hilbert (1905). This was Hilbert’s
first attempt at a “direct” consistency proof for arithmetic, i.e., one not based
on a reduction to another system, which he had posed as the second of his
famous list of problems (Hilbert, 1900).
When Hilbert once again started working on foundational issues following
the war, the first order of business was a formulation of logic. This was
accomplished in collaboration with Bernays between 1917 and 1920 (see
Sieg, 1999 and Zach, 1999), included the establishment of metatheoretical
results like completeness, decidability, and consistency for propositional logic
in 1917/18, and was followed by ever more nuanced axiom systems for propositional
and predicate logic. This first work in purely logical axiomatics was soon
extended to include mathematics. Here Hilbert followed his own proposal,
made first in 1905,5 to develop mathematics and logic simultaneously. The
extent of this simultaneous development is nowhere clearer than in Hilbert’s
conprf.tex; 21/03/2018; 17:29; p.3
4lecture course of 1921/22, where the ε-operator is first used as both a logical
notion, representing the quantifiers, and an arithmetical notion, representing
induction in the form of the least number principle. Hilbert realized then that
a consistency proof for all of mathematics is a difficult undertaking, best
attempted in stages:
Considering the great variety of connectives and interdependencies exhibited
by arithmetic, it is obvious from the start that we will the not be able to
solve the problem of proving consistency in one fell swoop. We will
instead first consider the simplest connectives, and then proceed to ever
higher operations and inference methods, whereby consistency has to
be established for each extension of the system of signs and inference
rules, so that these extensions do not endanger the consistency [result]
established in the preceding stage.
Another important aspect is that, following our plan for the complete
formalization of arithmetic, we have to develop the proper mathematical
formalism in connection with the formalism of the logical operations, so
that—as I have expressed it—a simultaneous construction of mathematics
and logic is executed.6
Hilbert had rather clear ideas, once the basic tools both of proof and of
formalization were in place, of what the stages should be. In an addendum
to the lecture course on Grundlagen der Mathematik, taught by Hilbert and
Bernays in 1922–23,7 he outlined them. The first stage had already been
accomplished: Hilbert gave consistency proofs for calculi of propositional
logic in his 1917/18 lectures. Stage II consist in the elementary calculus of
free variables, plus equality axioms and axioms for successor and predecessor.
The axioms are:
1. A → B → A 2. (A → A → B)→ A → B
3. (A → B →C)→ (B → A →C) 4. (B →C)→ (A → B)→ A →C
5. A&B → A 6. A&B → B
7. A → B → A&B 8. A → A∨B
9. B → A∨B 10. (A →C)→ (B →C)→ A∨B →C
11. A → A → B 12. (A → B)→ (A → B)→ B
13. a = a 14. a = b → A(a)→ A(b)
15. a+1 6= 0 16. δ(a+1) = a8
In Hilbert’s systems, Latin letters are variables; in particular, a, b, c, . . . ,
are individual variables and A, B, C, . . . , are formula variables. The rules
of inference are modus ponens and substitution for individual and formula
variables.
Hilbert envisaged his foundational project as a stepwise “simultaneous
development of logic and mathematics,” in which axiomatic systems for logic,
arithmetic, analysis, and finally set theory would be developed. Each stage
would require a proof of consistency before the next stage is developed. In a
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handwritten supplement to the typescript of the 1922–23 lecture notes on the
foundations of arithmetic, Hilbert presents a rough overview of what these
steps might be:
Outline. Stage II was elementary calculation, axioms 1–16.
Stage III. Now elementary number theory
Schema for definition of functions by recursion and modus ponens
will add the schema of induction to modus ponens
even if this coincides in substance with the results of intuitively obtained
number theory, we are now dealing with formulas, e.g, a+b = b+a.
Stage IIII. Transfinite inferences and parts of analysis
Stage V. Higher-order variables and set theory. Axiom of choice.
Stage VI. Numbers of the 2nd number class, full transfinite induction.
Higher types. Continuum problem, transfinite induction for numbers in
the 2nd number class.
Stage VII. (1) Replacement of infinitely many definitional schemata
by one axiom. (2) Analysis and set theory. At level 4, again the full
theorem of the least upper bound.
Stage VIII. Formalization of well ordering.9
2.1. THE PROPOSITIONAL CALCULUS AND THE CALCULUS OF
ELEMENTARY COMPUTATION
Step I had been achieved in 1917–18. Already in the lectures from the Winter
term 1917/18, Hilbert and Bernays had proved that the propositional calculus
is consistent. This was done first by providing an arithmetical interpretation,
where they stressed that only finitely many numbers had to be used as “values”
(0 and 1). The proof is essentially a modern proof of the soundness of propositional
logic: A truth value semantics is introduced by associating which each formula
of the propositional calculus a truth function mapping tuples of 0 and 1
(the values of the propositional variables) to 0 or 1 (the truth value of the
formula under the corresponing valuation). A formula is called correct if it
corresponds to a truth function which always takes the value 1. It is then
showed that the axioms are correct, and that modus ponens preserves correctness.
So every formula derivable in the propositional calculus is correct. Since
A and A cannot both be correct, they cannot both be derivable, and so the
propositional calculus is consistent.
It was very important for Hilbert that the model for the propositional
calculus thus provided by {0,1} was finite. As such, its existence, and the
admissibility of the consistency proof was beyond question. This lead him to
consider the consistency proof for the propositional calculus to be the prime
example for for a consistency proof by exhibition in his 1921/22 lectures
on the foundations of mathematics. The consistency problem in the form
of a demand for a consistency proof for an axiomatic system which neither
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the consistency of another, but by providing a metamathematical proof that
no derivation of a contradiction is possible, is first formulated in lectures in
the Summer term of 1920. Here we find a first formulation of an arithmetical
system and a proof of consistency. The system consists of the axioms
1 = 1
(a = b) → (a+1 = b+1)
(a+1 = b+1) → (a = b)
(a = b) → ((a = c)→ (b = c)).
The notes contain a proof that these four axioms, together with modus ponens,
do not allow the derivation of the formula
a+1 = 1.
The proof itself is not too interesting, and I will not reproduce it here.10 The
system considered is quite weak. It does not even contain all of propositional
logic: negation only appears as inequality, and only formulas with at most two
‘→’ signs are derivable. Not even a = a is derivable. It is here, nevertheless,
that we find the first statement of the most important ingredient of Hilbert’s
project, namely, proof theory:
Thus we are led to make the proofs themselves the object of our investigation;
we are urged towards a proof theory, which operates with the proofs
themselves as objects.
For the way of thinking of ordinary number theory the numbers are
then objectively exhibitable, and the proofs about the numbers already
belong to the area of thought. In our study, the proof itself is something
which can be exhibited, and by thinking about the proof we arrive at the
solution of our problem.
Just as the physicist examines his apparatus, the astronomer his position,
just as the philosopher engages in critique of reason, so the mathematician
needs his proof theory, in order to secure each mathematical theorem by
proof critique.11
This project is developed in earnest in two more lecture courses in 1921–
22 and 1922–23. These lectures are important in two respects. First, it is here
that the axiomatic systems whose consistency is to be proven are developed.
This is of particular interest for an understanding of the relationship of Hilbert
to Russell’s project in the Principia and the influence of Russell’s work both
on Hilbert’s philosophy and on the development of axiomatic systems for
mathematics.12 Sieg (1999) has argued that, in fact, Hilbert was a logicist
for a brief period around the time of his paper “Axiomatic Thought” (Hilbert,
1918a). However, as noted in Section 1, Hilbert soon became critical of Russell’s
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type theory, in particular of the axiom of reducibility. Instead of taking the
system of Principia as the adequate formalization of mathematics the consistency
of which was to be shown, Hilbert proposed a new system. The guiding
principle of this system was the “simultaneous development of logic and
mathematics”—as opposed to a development of mathematics out of logic—
which he had already proposed in Hilbert (1905, 176). The cornerstone of this
development is the ε-calculus. The second major contribution of the 1921–
22 and 1922–23 lectures are the consistency proofs themselves, including
the Hilbertsche Ansatz for the ε-substitution method, which were the direct
precursors to Ackermann’s dissertation of 1924.
In contrast to the first systems of 1920, here Hilbert uses a system based on
full propositional logic with axioms for equality, i.e., the elementary calculus
of free variables:
I. Logical axioms
a) Axioms of consequence
1) A → B → A
2) (A → A → B)→ A → B
3) (A → B →C)→ B → A →C
4) (B →C)→ (A → B)→ A →C
b) Axioms of negation
5) A → A → B
6) (A → B)→ (A → B)→ B
II. Arithmetical axioms
a) Axioms of equality
7) a = a
8) a = b → Aa → Ab
b) Axioms of number
9) a+1 6= 0
10) δ(a+1) = a13
Here, ‘+1’ is a unary function symbol. The rules of inference are substitution
(for individual and formula variables) and modus ponens.
Hilbert’s idea for how a finitistic consistency proof should be carried out
is first presented here. The idea is this: suppose a proof of a contradiction is
available. We may assume that the end formula of this proof is 0 6= 0.
1. Resolution into proof threads. First, we observe that by duplicating part
of the proof and leaving out steps, we can transform the derivation to one
where each formula (except the end formula) is used exactly once as the
premise of an inference. Hence, the proof is in tree form.
2. Elimination of variables. We transform the proof so that it contains no
free variables. This is accomplished by proceeding backwards from the
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is the conclusion of a substitution rule, the inference is removed. If a
formula is the conclusion of modus ponens it is of the form
A A→B
B′
where B′ results from B by substituting terms for free variables. If these
variables also occur in A, we substitute the same terms for them. Variables
in A which do not occur in B are replaced with 0. This yields a formula
A′ not containing variables.14 The inference is replaced by
A′ A′ →B′
B′
3. Reduction of functionals. The remaining derivation contains a number of
terms (functionals in Hilbert’s parlance) which now have to be reduced
to numerical terms (i.e., standard numerals of the form (. . . (0 + 1) +
· · ·)+1). In this case, this is done easily by rewriting innermost subterms
of the form δ(0) by 0 and δ(n+ 1) by n. In later stages, the set of
terms is extended by function symbols introduced by recursion, and the
reduction of functionals there proceeds by calculating the function for
given numerical arguments according to the recursive definition. This will
be discussed in the next section.
In order to establish the consistency of the axiom system, Hilbert suggests,
we have to find a decidable (konkret feststellbar) property of formulas so that
every formula in a derivation which has been transformed using the above
steps has the property, and the formula 0 6= 0 lacks it. The property Hilbert
proposes to use is correctness. This is not to be understood as truth in a model.
The formulas still occurring in the derivation after the transformation are all
Boolean combinations of equations between numerals. An equation between
numerals n=m is correct if n and m are syntactically equal, and the negation
of an equality is correct of m and n are not syntactically equal.
If we call a formula which does not contain variables or functionals other
than numerals an “explicit [numerical] formula”, then we can express
the result obtained thus: Every provable explicit [numerical] formula is
end formula of a proof all the formulas of which are explicit formulas.
This would have to hold in particular of the formula 0 6= 0, if it
were provable. The required proof of consistency is thus completed if
we show that there can be no proof of the formula which consists of
only explicit formulas.
To see that this is impossible it suffices to find a concretely determinable
[konkret feststellbar] property, which first of all holds of all explicit
conprf.tex; 21/03/2018; 17:29; p.8
The Practice of Finitism 9
formulas which result from an axiom by substitution, which furthermore
transfers from premises to end formula in an inference, which however
does not apply to the formula 0 6= 0.15
Hilbert now defines the notion of a (conjunctive) normal form and gives a
procedure to transform a formula into such a normal form. He then provides
the wanted property:
With the help of the notion of a normal form we are now in a position
to exhipit a property which distinguishes the formula 0 6= 0 from the
provable explicit formulas.
We divide the explicit formulas into “correct” and “incorrect.” The
explicit atomic formulas are equations with numerals on either side [of
the equality symbol]. We call such an equation correct, if the numerals
on either side coincide, otherwise we call it incorrect. We call an inequality
with numerals on either side correct if the two numerals are different,
otherwise we call it incorrect.
In the normal form of an arbitrary explicit formula, each disjunct has
the form of an equation or an inequality with numerals on either side.
We now call a general explicit formula correct if in the corresponding
normal form each disjunction which occurs as a conjunct (or which
constitutes the normal form) contains a correct equation or a correct
inequality. Otherwise we call the formula incorrect. [. . . ]
According to this definition, the question of whether an explicit formula
is correct or incorrect is concretely decidable in every case. Thus the
“tertium non datur” holds here. . . 16
This use in the 1921–22 lectures of the conjunctive normal form of a propositional
formula to define correctness of Boolean combinations of equalities between
numerals goes back to the 1917–18 lecture notes,17 where transformation
into conjunctive normal form and testing whether each conjunct contains
both A and A was proposed as a test for propositional validity. Similarly,
here a formula is correct if each conjunct in its conjunctive normal form
contains a correct equation or a correct inequality.18 In the 1922–23 lectures,
the definition involving conjunctive normal forms is replaced by the usual
inductive definition of propositional truth and falsehood by truth tables (Hilbert
and Bernays 1923a, 21). Armed with the definition of correct formula, Hilbert
can prove that the derivation resulting from a proof by transforming it according
to (1)–(3) above contains only correct formulas. Since 0 6= 0 is plainly not
correct, there can be no proof of 0 6= 0 in the system consisting of axioms
(1)–(10). The proof is a standard induction on the length of the derivation: the
formulas resulting from the axioms by elimination of variables and reduction
of functionals are all correct, and modus ponens preserves correctness.19
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2.2. ELEMENTARY NUMBER THEORY WITH RECURSION AND
INDUCTION RULE
The system of stage III consists of the basic system of the elementary calculus
of free variables and the successor function, extended by the schema of defining
functions by primitive recursion and the induction rule.20 A primitive recursive
definition is a pair of axioms of the form
ϕ(0,b1, . . . ,bn) = a(b1, . . . ,bn)
ϕ(a+1,b1, . . . ,bn) = b(a,ϕ(a),b1, . . . ,bn)
where a(b1, . . . ,bn) contains only the variables b1, . . . , bn, and b(a,c,b1, . . . ,bn)
contains only the variables a, c, b1, . . . , bn. Neither contains the function
symbol ϕ or any function symbols which have not yet been defined.
The introduction of primitive recursive definitions and the induction rule
serves, first of all, the purpose of expressivity. Surely any decent axiom system
for arithmetic must provide the means of expressing basic number-theoretic
states of affairs, and this includes addition, subtraction, multiplication, division,
greatest common divisor, etc. The general schema of primitive recursion is
already mentioned in the Kneser notes for 1921–22 (Hilbert, 1922a, Heft
II, 29), and is discussed in some detail in the notes for the lectures of the
following year (Hilbert and Bernays, 1923a, 26–30).
It may be interesting to note that in the 1922–23 lectures, there are no
axioms for addition or multiplication given before the general schema for
recursive definition. This suggests a change in emphasis during 1922, when
Hilbert realized the importance of primitive recursion as an arithmetical concept
formation. He later continued to develop the notion, hoping to capture all
number theoretic functions using an extended notion of primitive recursion
and to solve the continuum problem with it. This can be seen from the attempt
at a proof of the continuum hypothesis in (1926), and Ackermann’s paper on
“Hilbert’s construction of the reals” (1928b), which deals with hierarchies
of recursive functions. The general outlook in this regard is also markedly
different from Skolem’s 1923, which is usually credited with the definition of
primitive recursive arithmetic.21
Hilbert would be remiss if he would not be including induction in his
arithmetical axiom systems. As he already indicates in the 1921–22 lectures,
however, the induction principle cannot be formulated as an axiom without
the help of quantifiers.
We are still completely missing the axiom of complete induction. One
might think it would be
{Z(a)→ (A(a)→ A(a+1))} → {A(1)→ (Z(b)→ A(b))}
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That is not it, for take a= 1. The hypothesis must hold for all a. We have,
however, no means to bring the all into the hypothesis. Our formalism
does not yet suffice to write down the axiom of induction.
But as a schema we can: We extend our methods of proof by the
following schema.
K(1) K(a)→ K(a+1)
Z(a)→ K(a)
Now it makes sense to ask whether this schema can lead to a contradiction.22
The induction schema is thus necessary in the formulation of the elementary
calculus only because quantifiers are not yet available. Subsequently, induction
will be subsumed in the ε-calculus.
The consistency proof for stage II is extended to cover also the induction
schema and primitive recursive definitions. Both are only sketched: Step (3),
reduction of functionals, is extended to cover terms containing primitive recursive
functions by recursively computing the value of the innermost term containing
only numerals. Both in the 1921–22 and the 1922–23 sets of notes by Kneser,
roughly a paragraph is devoted to these cases (the official sets of notes for
both lectures do not contain the respective passages).
How de we proceed for recursions? Suppose a ϕ(z) occurs. Either [z is]
0, then we replace it by a. Or [it is of the form] ϕ(z+1): [replace it with]
b(z,ϕ(z)). Claim: These substitutions eventually come to an end, if we
replace innermost occurrences first.23
The claim is not proved, and there is no argument that the process terminates
even for terms containing several different, nested primitive recursively defined
function symbols.
For the induction schema, Hilbert hints at how the consistency proof must
be extended. Combining elimination of variables and reduction of functionals
we are to proceed upwards in the proof as before until we arrive at an instance
of the induction schema:
K(1) K(a)→ K(a+1)
Z(z)→ K′(z)
By copying the proof ending in the right premise, substituting numerals 1,
. . . , y (where z = y+ 1) for a and applying the appropriate substitutions to
the other variables in K we obtain a proof of Z(a)→ K′(z) without the last
application of the induction schema.
With the introduction of the ε-calculus, the induction rule is of only minor
importance, and its consistency is never proved in detail until Hilbert and
Bernays (1934, 298–99).
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2.3. THE ε-CALCULUS AND THE AXIOMATIZATION OF MATHEMATICS
In the spirit of the “simultaneous development of logic and mathematics,”
Hilbert takes the next step in the axiomatization of arithmetic by employing
a principle taken from Zermelo’s axiomatization of set theory: the axiom of
choice. Hilbert and Bernays had dealt in detail with quantifiers in lectures in
1917–18 and 1920, but they do not directly play a significant role in the axiom
systems Hilbert develops for mathematics. Rather, the first- and higher-order
calculi for which consistency proofs are proposed, are based instead on choice
functions. The first presentation of these ideas can be found in the 1921–22
lecture notes by Kneser (the official notes do not contain these passages). The
motivation is that in order to deal with analysis, one has to allow definitions
of functions which are not finitary. These concept formations, necessary for
the development of mathematics free from intuitionist restrictions, include
definition of functions from undecidable properties, by unbounded search,
and choice.
Not finitely (recursively) defined is, e.g., ϕ(a) = 0 if there is a b so that
a5 + ab3 + 7 is prime, and = 1 otherwise. But only with these numbers
and functions the real mathematical interest begins, since the solvability
in finitely many steps is not foreseeable. We have the conviction, that
such questions, e.g., the value of ϕ(a), are solvable, i.e., that ϕ(a) is also
finitely definable. We cannot wait on this, however, we must allow such
definitions for otherwise we would restrict the free practice of science.
We also need the concept of a function of functions.24
The concepts which Hilbert apparently takes to be fundamental for this project
are the principle of the excluded middle and the axiom of choice, in the form
of second-order functions τ and α. The axioms for these functions are
1. τ( f ) = 0 → (Z(a)→ f (a) = 1)
2. τ( f ) 6= 0 → Z(α( f ))
3. τ( f ) 6= 0 → f (α( f )) 6= 1
4. τ( f ) 6= 0 → τ( f ) = 1
The intended interpretation is: τ( f ) = 0 if f is always 1 and = 1 if one can
choose an α( f ) so that f (α( f )) 6= 1.
The introduction of τ and α allows Hilbert to replace universal and existential
quantifiers, and also provides the basis for proofs of the axiom of induction
and the least upper bound principle. Furthermore, Hilbert claims, the consistency
of the resulting system can be seen in the same way used to establish the
consistency of stage III (primitive recursive arithmetic). From a proof of
a numerical formula using τ’s and α’s, these terms can be eliminated by
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finding numerical substitutions which turn the resulting formulas into correct
numerical formulas.
These proofs are sketched in the last part of the 1921–22 lecture notes by
Kneser (Hilbert, 1922a).25 In particular, the consistency proof contains the
entire idea of the Hilbertsche Ansatz, the ε-substitution method:
First we show that we can eliminate all variables, since here also only
free variables occur. We look for the innermost τ and α. Below these
there are only finitely defined [primitive recursive] functions ϕ, ϕ′. Some
of these functions can be substituted for f in the axioms in the course
of the proof. 1: τ(ϕ) = 0 → (Z(a)→ ϕ(a) = 1), where a is a functional.
If this is not used, we set all α(ϕ) and τ(ϕ) equal to zero. Otherwise
we reduce a and ϕ(a) and check whether Z(a) → ϕ(a) = 1 is correct
everywhere it occurs. If it is correct, we set τ[ϕ] = 0, α[ϕ] = 0. If it is
incorrect, i.e., if a = z, ϕ(z) 6= 1, we let τ(ϕ) = 1, α(ϕ) = z. After this
replacement, the proof remains a proof. The formulas which take the
place of the axioms are correct.
(The idea is: if a proof is given, we can extract an argument from it
for which ϕ = 1.) In this way we eliminate the τ and α and applications
of [axioms] (1)–(4) and obtain a proof of 1 6= 1 from I–V and correct
formulas, i.e., from I–V,
τ( f ,b) = 0 → {Z(a)→ f (a,b) = 1}
τ( f ,b) 6= 0 → Z( f (α,b))
τ( f ,b) 6= 0 → f (α( f ,b),b) 6= 1
τ( f ,b) 6= 0 → τ( f ,b) = 126
Although not formulated as precisely as subsequent presentations, all the
ingredients of Hilbert’s ε-substitution method are here. The only changes that
are made en route to the final presentation of Hilbert’s sketch of the case for
one ε and Ackermann’s are mostly notational. In (Hilbert, 1923), a talk given
in September 1922, the two functions τ and α are merged to one function
(also denoted τ), which in addition provides the least witness for τ( f (a)) 6= 1.
There the τ function is also applied directly to formulas. In fact, τaA(a) is the
primary notion, denoting the least witness a for which A(a) is false; τ( f ) is
defined as τa( f (a) = 0). Interestingly enough, the sketch given there for the
substitution method is for the τ-function for functions, not formulas, just as it
was in the 1921–22 lectures.
The most elaborate discussion of the ε-calculus can be found in Hilbert’s
and Bernays’s course of 1922–23. Here, again, the motivation for the ε-function
is Zermelo’s axiom of choice:
What are we missing?
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1. As far as logic is concerned: we have had the propositional calculus
extended by free variables, i.e., variables for which arbitrary functionals
may be substituted. Operating with “all” and “there is” is still missing.
2. We have added the induction schema, but without consistency proof
and also on a provisional basis, with the intention of removing it.
3. So far only the arithmetical axioms which refer to whole numbers.
The above shortcomings prevent us from building up analysis (limit
concept, irrational number).
These 3 points already give us a plan and goals for the following.
We turn to (1). It is clear that a logic without “all’—“there is” would
be incomplete, I only recall how the application of these concepts and of
the so-called transfinite inferences has brought about major problems.
We have not yet addressed the question of the applicability of these
concepts to infinite totalities. Now we could proceed as we did with the
propositional calculus: Formulate a few simple [principles] as axioms,
from which all others follow. Then the consistency proof would have to
be carried out—according to our general program: with the attitude that
a proof is a figure given to us. Significant obstacles to the consistency
proof because of the bound variables. The deeper investigation, however,
shows that the real core of the problem lies at a different point, to which
one usually only pays attention later, and which also has only been
noticed in the literature of late.27
At the corresponding place in the Kneser Mitschrift, Hilbert continues:
[This core lies] in Zermelo’s axiom of choice. [. . . ] The objections [of
Brouwer and Weyl] are directed against the choice principle. But they
should likewise be directed against “all” and “there is”, which are based
on the same basic idea.
We want to extend the axiom of choice. To each proposition with a
variable A(a) we assign an object for which the proposition holds only
if is holds in general. So, a counterexample, if one exists.
ε(A), an individual logical function. [. . . ] ε satisfies the transfinite
axiom:
(16) A(εA)→ Aa
e.g., Aa means: a is corrupt. εA is Aristides.28
Hilbert goes on to show how quantifiers can be replaced by ε-terms. The
corresponding definitional axioms are already included in Hilbert (1923), i.e.,
A(εA) ≡ (a)A(a) and A(εA) ≡ (∃a)A(a). Next, Hilbert outlines a derivation
of the induction axioms using the ε-axioms. For this, it is necessary to require
that the choice function takes the minimal value, which is expressed by the
additional axiom
εA 6= 0 → A(δ(εA)).
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With this addition, Hilbert combined the κ function of (Hilbert, 1922c) and
the µ function of (1923) with the ε function. Both κ (“k” for Kleinstes, least)
and µ had been introduced there as functions of functions giving the least
value for which the function differs from 0. In Hilbert (1923, 161–162),
Hilbert indicates that the axiom of induction can be derived using the µ function,
and credits this to Dedekind (1888).
The third issue Hilbert addresses is that of dealing with real numbers, and
extending the calculus to analysis. A first step can be carried out at stage IV by
considering a real number as a function defining an infinite binary expansion.
A sequence of reals can then be given by a function with two arguments.
Already in Hilbert (1923) we find a sketch of the proof of the least upper
bound principle for such a sequence of reals, using the pi function:
piA(a) =
{0 if (a)A(a)
1 otherwise
The general case of sets of reals needs function variables and second-order ε
and pi. These are briefly introduced as ε f A with the axioms
Aε f A → A f
( f )A f → pi f A f = 0
( f )A f → pi f A f = 1
The last two lectures transcribed in (Hilbert and Bernays, 1923a) are devoted
to a sketch of the ε substitution method. The proof is adapted from Hilbert
(1923), replacing ε f with εA, also deals with pi, and covers the induction
axiom in its form for the ε-calculus.29 During the last lecture, Bernays also
extends the proof to second-order ε’s.
If we have a function variable:
Aε f A f → A f
[. . . ] Suppose ε only occurs with A (e.g., f 0 = 0, f f 0 = 0). How will we
eliminate the function variables? We simply replace f c by c. This does
not apply to bound variables. For those we take some fixed function, e.g.,
δ and carry out the reduction with it. Then we are left with, e.g., Aδ →
Aϕ. This, when reduced, is either correct or incorrect. In the latter case,
Aϕ is incorrect. Then we substitute ϕ everywhere for ε fA f . Then we
end up with Aϕ→Aψ. That is certainly correct, since Aϕ is incorrect.30
The last development regarding the ε-calculus before Ackermann’s dissertation
is the switch to the dual notation. Both (Hilbert, 1923) and (Hilbert and
Bernays, 1923a) use εA as denoting a counterexample for A, whereas at least
from Ackermann’s dissertation onwards, εA denotes a witness. Correspondingly,
Ackermann uses the dual axiom A(a)→ A(εaA(a)). Although it is relatively
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clear that the supplement to (Hilbert and Bernays, 1923a)—24 sheets in Hilbert’s
hand—are Hilbert’s notes based on which he and partly Bernays presented
the 1922–23 lectures, parts of it seem to have been altered or written after the
conclusion of the course. Sheets 12–14 contain a sketch of the proof of the
axiom of induction from the standard, dual ε axioms; the same proof for the
original axioms can be found on sheets 8–11.
This concludes the development of mathematical systems using the ε-
calculus and consistency proofs for them presented by Hilbert himself. We
now turn to the more advanced and detailed treatment in Wilhelm Ackermann’s
(1924b) dissertation.
3. Ackermann’s Dissertation
Wilhelm Ackermann was born in 1896 in Westphalia. He studied mathematics,
physics, and philosophy in Go¨ttingen between 1914 and 1924, serving in the
army in World War I from 1915–1919. He completed his studies in 1924 with
a dissertation, written under Hilbert, entitled “Begru¨ndung des ‘tertium non
datur’ mittels der Hilbertschen Theorie der Widerspruchsfreiheit” (Acker-
mann, 1924a; 1924b), the first major contribution to proof theory and Hilbert’s
Program. In 1927 he decided for a career as a high school teacher rather than
a career in academia, but remained scientifically active. His major contri-
butions to logic include the function which carries his name—an example
of a recursive but not primitive recursive function (Ackermann, 1928b), the
consistency proof for arithmetic using the ε-substitution method (Ackermann,
1940), and his work on the decision problem (Ackermann, 1928a; 1954). He
served as co-author, with Hilbert, of the influential logic textbook Grundzu¨ge
der theoretischen Logik (Hilbert and Ackermann, 1928). He died in 1962.31
Ackermann’s 1924 dissertation is of particular interest since it is the first
non-trivial example of what Hilbert considered to be a finitistic consistency
proof. Von Neumann’s paper of 1927 does not entirely fit into the tradition of
the Hilbert school, and we have no evidence of the extent of Hilbert’s involve-
ment in its writing. Later consistency proofs, in particular those by Gentzen
and Kalma´r, were written after Go¨del’s incompleteness results were already
well-known and their implications understood by proof theorists. Ackermann’s
work, on the other hand, arose entirely out of Hilbert’s research project, and
there is ample evidence that Hilbert was aware of the range and details of
the proof. Hilbert was Ackermann’s dissertation advisor, approved the thesis,
was editor of Mathematische Annalen, where the thesis was published, and
corresponded with Ackermann on corrections and extensions of the result.
Ackermann was also in close contact with Paul Bernays, Hilbert’s assistant
and close collaborator in foundational matters. Ackermann spent the first half
of 1925 in Cambridge, supported by a fellowship from the International Ed-
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ucation Board (founded by John D. Rockefeller, Jr., in 1923). In his letter of
recommendation for Ackermann, Hilbert writes:
In his thesis “Foundation of the ‘tertium non datur’ using Hilbert’s the-
ory of consistency,” Ackermann has shown in the most general case that
the use of the words “all” and “there is,” of the “tertium non datur,” is
free from contradiction. The proof uses exclusively primitive and finite
inference methods. Everything is demonstratded, as it were, directly on
the mathematical formalism.
Ackermann has here surmounted considerable mathematical diffi-
culties and solved a problem which is of first importance to the modern
efforts directed at providing a new foundation for mathematics.32
Further testimony of Hilbert’s high esteem for Ackermann can be found in
the draft of a letter to Russell asking for a letter of support to the International
Education Board, where he writes that “Ackermann has taken my classes on
foundations of mathematics in recent semesters and is currently one of the
best masters of the theory which I have developed here.”33
Ackermann’s work provides insight into two important issues relating to
Hilbert’s program as it concerns finitistic consistency proofs. First, it provides
historical insight into the aims and development of Hilbert’s Program: The
first part of the program called for an axiomatization of mathematics. These
axiomatizations were then the objects of metamathematical investigations:
the aim was to find finitistic consistency proofs for them. Which areas of
mathematics were supposed to be covered by the consistency proofs, how
were they axiomatized, what is the strength of the systems so axiomatized?
We have already seen what Hilbert’s roadmap for the project of axiomatiza-
tion was. Ackermann’s dissertation provides the earliest example of a formal
system stronger than elementary arithmetic. The second aim, the metamath-
ematical investigation of the formal systems obtained, also poses historical
questions: When did Ackermann, and other collaborators of Hilbert (in par-
ticular, Bernays and von Neumann) achieve the results they sought? Was
Ackermann’s proof correct, and if not, what parts of it can be made to work?
The other information we can extract from an analysis of Ackermann’s
work is what methods were used or presupposed in the consistency proofs
that were given, and thus, what methods were sanctioned by Hilbert himself
as falling under the finitist standpoint. Such an analysis of the methods used
are of a deeper, conceptual interest. There is a fundamental division between
Hilbert’s philosophical remarks on finitism on the one hand, and the professed
goals of the program on the other. In these comments, rather little is said
about the concept formations and proof methods that a finitist, according to
Hilbert, is permitted to use. In fact, most of Hilbert’s remarks deal with the
objects of finitism, and leave the finitistically admissible forms of definition
and proof to the side. These, however, are the questions at issue in contempo-
rary conceptual analyses of finitism. Hilbert’s relative silence on the matter
conprf.tex; 21/03/2018; 17:29; p.17
18
is responsible for the widespread—and largely correct—opinion that Hilbert
was too vague on the question of what constitutes finitism to unequivocally
define the notion, and therefore later commentators have had enough leeway
to disagree widely on the strength of the finitist standpoint while still claiming
to have explicated Hilbert’s own concept.
3.1. SECOND-ORDER PRIMITIVE RECURSIVE ARITHMETIC
In Ackermann (1924b), the system of stage III is extended by second-order
variables for functions. The schema of recursive definition is then extended
to include terms containing such variables. In the following outline, I shall
follow Ackermann and adopt the notation of subscripting function symbols
and terms by variables to indicate that these variables do not occur freely but
rather as placeholders for functions. For instance, aa( f (a)) indicates that the
term a does not contain the variable a free, but rather that the function f (a)
appears as a functional argument, i.e., that the term is of the form a(λa. f (a)).
The schema of second-order primitive recursion is the following:
ϕ~bi(0, ~f (~bi),~c) = a~bi(~f (~bi),~c)
ϕ~bi(a+1, ~f (~bi),~c) = b~bi(a,ϕ~di(a, ~f (~di),~c), ~f (~bi))
To clarify the subscript notation, compare this with the schema of second-
order primitive recursion using λ-abstraction notation:
ϕ(0,λ~bi.~f (~bi),~c) = a(λ~bi.~f (~bi),~c)
ϕ(a+1,λ~bi.~f (~bi),~c) = b(a,ϕ(a,λ~di.~f (~di),~c),λ~bi.~f (~bi))
Using this schema, it is possible to define the Ackermann function. This was
already pointed out in Hilbert (1926), although it was not until Ackermann
(1928b) that it was shown that the function so defined cannot be defined by
primitive recursion without function variables. Ackermann (1928b) defines
the function as follows. First it is observed that the iteration function
ρc(a, f (c),b) = f (. . . f ( f︸ ︷︷ ︸
a f ’s
(b)) . . .)
can be defined by second-order primitive recursion:
ρc(0, f (c),b) = b
ρc(a+1, f (c),b) = f (ρc(a, f (c),b))
Furthermore, we have two auxiliary functions
ι(a,b) =
{
1 if a = b
0 if a 6= b and λ(a,b) =
{0 if a 6= b
1 if a = b
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which are primitive recursive, as well as addition and multiplication. The term
a(a,b) is short for ι(a,1) · ι(a,0) ·b+λ(a,1); we then have
a(a,b) =
{0 if a = 0
1 if a = 1
b otherwise
The Ackermann function is defined by
ϕ(0,b,c) = b+ c
ϕ(a+1,b,c) = ρd(c,ϕ(a,b,d),a(a,b)).
In more suggestive terms,
ϕ(0,b,c) = b+ c
ϕ(1,b,c) = b · c
ϕ(a+1,b,c) = ϕ(a,b,ϕ(a,b, . . .ϕ(a,b,b) · · ·))︸ ︷︷ ︸
c times
The system of second-order primitive recursive arithmetic 2PRA− used in
Ackermann (1924b) consists of axioms (1)–(15) of Hilbert and Bernays (1923b,
see Section 2), axiom (16) was replaced by
16. a 6= 0 → a = δ(a)+1,
plus defining equations for both first- and second-order primitive recursive
functions. There is no induction rule (which is usually included in systems
of primitive recursive arithmetic), although the consistency proof given by
Ackermann can easily be extended to cover it.
3.2. THE CONSISTENCY PROOF FOR PRIMITIVE RECURSIVE
ARITHMETIC
Allowing primitive recursion axioms for functions which contain function
variables is a natural extension of the basic calculus of stages III and IIII, and
is necessary in order to be able to introduce sufficiently complex functions.
Hilbert seems to have thought that by extending primitive recursion in this
way, or at least by building an infinite hierarchy of levels of primitive recur-
sions using variables of higher types, he could account for all the number
theoretic functions, and hence for all real numbers (represented as decimal
expansions). In the spirit of the stage-by-stage development of systems of
mathematics and consistency proofs, it is of course necessary to show the
consistency of the system of stage IIII, which is the system presented by
Ackermann. As before, it makes perfect sense to first establish the consistency
for the fragment of stage IIII not containing the transfinite ε and pi functions.
In Section 4 of his dissertation, Ackermann undertakes precisely this aim.
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The proof is a direct extension of the consistency proof of stage III, the el-
ementary calculus of free variables with basic arithmetical axioms and prim-
itive recursive definitions, i.e., PRA. This proof had already been presented
in Hilbert’s lectures in 1921–22 and 1922–23. The idea here is the same:
put a given, purported proof of 0 6= 0 into tree form, eliminate variables, and
reduce functionals. The remaining figure consists entirely of correct formulas,
where correctness of a formula is a syntactically defined and easily decidable
property. The only complication for the case where function variables are
also admitted is the reduction of functionals. It must be shown that every
functional, i.e., every term of the language, can be reduced to a numeral on
the basis of the defining recursion equations. For the original case, this could
be done by a relatively simple inductive proof. For the case of 2PRA−, it is
not so obvious.
Ackermann locates the difficulty in the following complication. Suppose
you have a functional ϕb(2,b(b)). Here, b(b) is a term which denotes a
function, and so there is no way to replace the variable b with a numeral
before evaluating the entire term. In effect, the variable b is bound (in modern
notation, the term might be more suggestively written ϕ(2,λb.b(b)).) In order
to reduce this term, we apply the recursion equations for ϕ and might end up
with a term like
b(1)+b(2)+b(0) ·b(1)+b(1) ·b(2).
The remaining b’s might in turn contain ϕ. By contrast, reducing a term ψ(z)
where ψ is defined by first-order primitive recursion results in a term which
does not contain ψ.
To show that the reduction indeed comes to an end if innermost subterms
are reduced first, Ackermann proposes to assign indices to terms and show
that each reduction reduces this index. The indices are, essentially, ordinal
notations <ωωω . Since this is probably the first proof using ordinal notations,
it may be of some interest to repeat and analyze it in some detail here. In
my presentation, I stay close to Ackermann’s argument and only change the
notation for ranks, indices, and orders: Where Ackermann uses sequences of
natural numbers, I will use the more perspicuous ordinal notations.
Suppose the primitive recursive functions are arranged in a linear order
according to the order of definition. We write ϕ < ψ if ϕ occurs before ψ
in the order of definition, i.e., ψ cannot be used in the defining equations
for ϕ. Suppose further that we are given a specific term t. The notion of
subordination is defined as follows: an occurrence of a function symbol ξ in t
is subordinate to an occurrence of ϕ, if ϕ is the outermost function symbol of
a subterm s, the occurrence of ξ is in s, and the subterm of s with outermost
function symbol ξ contains a bound variable b in whose scope the occurrence
of ϕ is (this includes the case where b happens to be bound by ϕ itself).34 In
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other words, t is of the form
t′(. . .ϕb(. . .ξ(. . .b . . .) . . .) . . .)
The rank rk(t,ϕ) of an occurrence of a function symbol ϕ with respect to t is
defined as follows: If there is no occurrence of ψ > ϕ which is subordinate to
ϕ in t, then rk(t,ϕ) = 1. Otherwise,
rk(t,ϕ) = max{rk(t,ψ) : ψ > ϕ is subordinate to ϕ}+1.
The rank r(t,ϕ) of a term t with respect to a function symbol ϕ is the maxi-
mum of the ranks of occurrences of ϕ or ψ > ϕ in t. (If neither ϕ nor ψ > ϕ
occur in t, that means r(t,ϕ) = 0.
We assign to a subterm s of t a sequence of ranks of ψn, . . . , ψ0 with
respect to s, where ψ0 < · · · < ψn are all function symbols occurring in t.
This is the order of s:
o(s) = 〈r(s,ψn), . . . ,r(s,ψ0)〉
We may think of this order as an ordinal < ωω, specifically, o(s) corresponds
to
ωn · r(s,ψn) ·+ · · ·+ω · r(s,ψ1) ·+r(s,ψ0)
Now consider the set of all distinct subterms of t of a given order o which
are not numerals. The degree d(t,o) of o in t is the cardinality of that set.
The index j(t) of t is the sequence of degrees ordered in the same way as the
orders, i.e., it corresponds to an ordinal of the form
∑
o
ωo ·d(t,o)
where the sum ranges over all orders o. Obviously, this is an ordinal < ωωω .
Ackermann does not use ordinals to define these indices; he stresses that
he is only dealing with finite sequences of numbers, on which an elaborate
order is imposed. Rather than appeal to the well-orderedness of ωωω , he gives
a more direct argument that by repeatedly proceeding to indices which are
smaller in the imposed order one eventually has to reach the index which
consists of all 0.
Suppose a term t not containing ε or pi is given. Let s be an innermost
constant subterm which is not a numeral, we may assume it is of the form
ϕ
¯b(z1, . . . ,zn,u1, . . . ,um) where ui is a term with at least one variable bound
by ϕ and which doesn’t contain a constant subterm. We have two cases:
(1) s does not contain bound variables, i.e., m = 0. The order of s is ωk
(where ϕ = ψk). Evaluating the term s by recursion results in a term s′ in
which only function symbols of lower index occur. Hence, the highest expo-
nent in the order of s′ is less than i, and so o(s′) < o(s). Furthermore, since
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no variable which is bound in t can occur in s′ (since no such variable occurs
in s), replacing s by s′ in t does not result in new occurrences of function
symbols which are subordinate to any other. Thus the number of subterms in
the term t′ which results from such a replacement with orders > o(s) remains
the same, while the number of subterms of order o(s) is reduced by 1. Hence,
j(t′)< j(t).
(2) s does contain bound variables. For simplicity, assume that there is
one numeral argument and one functional argument, i.e., s is of the form
ϕb(z,c(b)). In this case, all function symbols occurring in c(b) are subordinate
to ϕ, or otherwise c(b) would contain a constant subterm.35 Thus, the rank of
c(b) in t with respect to ψi is less that the rank of s with respect to ψi.
We reduce the subterm s to a subterm s′ by applying the recursion. s′ does
not contain the function symbol ϕ. We want to show that replacing s by s′ in
t lowers the index of t.
First, note that when substituting a term a for b in c(b), the order of the
resulting c(a) with respect to ϕ is the maximum of the orders of c(b) and
a, since none of the occurrences of function symbols in a contain bound
variables whose scope begins outside of a, and so none of these variables
are subordinate to any function symbols in c(b).
Now we prove the claim by induction on z. Suppose the defining equation
for ϕ is
ϕb(0, f (b)) = ab( f (b))
ϕb(a+1, f (b)) = bb(ϕc(a, f (c)),a, f (b)).
If z = 0, then s′ = ab(c(b)). At a place where f (b) is an argument to a func-
tion, f (b) is replaced by c(d), and d is not in the scope of any ϕ (since a
doesn’t contain ϕ). For instance, ab( f (b)) = 2+ψd(3, f (d)). Such a replace-
ment cannot raise the ϕ-rank of s′ above that of c(b). The term c might also
be used in places where it is not a functional argument, e.g., if ab( f (b)) =
f (ψ( f (2))). By a simple induction on the nesting of f ’s in ab( f (b)) it can be
seen that the ϕ-rank of s′ is the same as that of c(b): For c(d) where d does
not contain c, the ϕ-rank of c(d) equals that of c(b) by the note above and the
fact that d does not contain ϕ. If d does contain a nested c, then by induction
hypothesis and the first case, its ϕ-rank is the same as that of c(b). By the
note, again, the entire subterm has the same ϕ-rank as c(b).
The case of ϕb(z+1,c(b)) is similar. Here, the first replacement is
bb(ϕc(z,c(c)),z,c(b)).
Further recursion replaces ϕc(z,c(c)) by another term which, by induction
hypothesis, has ϕ-rank less than or equal to that of c(b). The same considera-
tions as in the base case show that the entire term also has a ϕ-rank no larger
than c(b).
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We have thus shown that eliminating the function symbol ϕ by recursion
from an innermost constant term reduces the ϕ-rank of the term at least by
one and does not increase the ψ j-ranks of any subterms for any j > i.
In terms of ordinals, this shows that at least one subterm of order o was
reduced to a subterm of order o′ < o, all newly introduced subterms have
order < o, and the order of no old subterm increased. Thus, the index of the
entire term was reduced. The factor ωo ·n changed to ωo · (n−1).
We started with a given constant function, which we characterized by
a determinate index. We replaced a ϕb(z,c(b)) within that functional by
another functional, where the ϕ-rank decreased and the rank with respect
to functions to the right of ϕ [i.e., which come after ϕ in the order of
definition] did not increase. Now we apply the same operation to the
resulting functional. After finitely many steps we obtain a functional
which contains no function symbols at all, i.e., it is a numeral.
We have thus shown: a constant functional, which does not contain
ε and pi, can be reduced to a numeral in finitely many steps.36
3.3. ORDINALS, TRANSFINITE RECURSION, AND FINITISM
It is quite remarkable that the earliest extensive and detailed technical con-
tribution to the finitist project would make use of transfinite induction in a
way not dissimilar to Gentzen’s later proof by induction up to ε0. This bears
on a number of questions regarding Hilbert’s understanding of the strength
of finitism. In particular, it is often said that Gentzen’s proof is not fini-
tist, because it uses transfinite induction. However, Ackermann’s original
consistency proof for 2PRA− also uses transfinite induction, using an index
system which is essentially an ordinal notation system, just like Gentzen’s.
If it is granted that Ackermann’s proof is finitistic, but Gentzen’s is not, i.e.,
transfinite induction up to ωωω is finitistic but not up to ε0, then where—
and why—should the line be drawn? Furthermore, the consistency proof of
2PRA− is in essence a—putatively finitistic—explanation of how to compute
second order primitive recursive functions, and a proof that the computation
procedure defined by them always terminates. In other words, it is a finitistic
proof that second order primitive recursive functions are well defined.37
Ackermann was completely aware of the involvement of transfinite induc-
tion in this case, but he sees in it no violation of the finitist standpoint.
The disassembling of functionals by reduction does not occur in the
sense that a finite ordinal is decreased each time an outermost function
symbol is eliminated. Rather, to each functional corresponds as it were
a transfinite ordinal number as its rank, and the theorem, that a constant
functional is reduced to a numeral after carrying out finitely many op-
erations, corresponds to the other [theorem], that if one descends from
a transfinite ordinal number to ever smaller ordinal numbers, one has to
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reach zero after a finite number of steps. Now there is naturally no men-
tion of transfinite sets or ordinal numbers in our metamathematical in-
vestigations. It is however interesting, that the mentioned theorem about
transfinite ordinals can be formulated so that there is nothing transfinite
about it.
Consider a transfinite ordinal number less than ω ·ω. Each such or-
dinal number can be written in the form: ω ·n+m, where n and m are
finite numbers. Hence such an ordinal can also be characterized by a pair
of finite numbers (n,m), where the order of these numbers is of course
significant. To the descent in the series of ordinals corresponds the fol-
lowing operation on the number pair (n,m). Either the first number n
remains the same, then the number m is replaced by a smaller number
m′. Or the first number n is made smaller; then I can put an arbitrary
number in the second position, which can also be larger than m. It is
clear that one has to reach the number pair (0,0) after finitely many
steps. For after at most m+1 steps I reach a number pair, where the first
number is smaller than n. Let (n′,m′) be that pair. After at most m′+ 1
steps I reach a number pair in which the first number is again smaller
than n′, etc. After finitely many steps one reaches the number pair (0,0)
in this fashion, which corresponds to the ordinal number 0. In this form,
the mentioned theorem contains nothing transfinite whatsoever; only
considerations which are acceptable in metamathematics are used. The
same holds true if one does not use pairs but triples, quadruples, etc.
This idea is not only used in the following proof that the reduction of
functionals terminates, but will also be used again and again later on,
especially in the finiteness proof at the end of the work.38
Over ten years later, Ackermann discusses the application of transfinite
induction for consistency proofs in correspondence with Bernays. Gentzen’s
consistency proof had been published (Gentzen, 1936), and Gentzen asks,
through Bernays,
whether you [Ackermann] think that the method of proving termination
[Endlichkeitsbeweis] by transfinite induction can be applied to the con-
sistency proof of your dissertation. I would like it very much, if that were
possible.39
In his reply, Ackermann recalls his own use of transfinite ordinals in the 1924
dissertation.
I just realized now, as I am looking at my dissertation, that I operate with
transfinite ordinals in a similar fashion as Gentzen.40
A year and a half later, Ackermann mentions the transfinite induction used in
his dissertation again:
I do not know, by the way, whether you are aware (I did at the time not
consider it as a transgression beyond the narrower finite standpoint), that
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transfinite inferences are used in my dissertation. (Cf., e.g., the remarks
in the last paragraph on page 13 and the following paragraph of my
dissertation).41
These remarks may be puzzling, since they seem to suggest that Bernays was
not familiar with Ackermann’s work. This is clearly not the case. Bernays cor-
responded with Ackerman extensively in the mid-20s about the ε-substitution
method and the decision problem, and had clearly studied Ackermann’s dis-
sertation. Neither Bernays nor Hilbert are on record objecting to the methods
used in Ackermann’s dissertation. It can thus be concluded that Ackermann’s
use of transfinite induction was considered acceptable from the finitist stand-
point.
3.4. THE ε-SUBSTITUTION METHOD
As we have seen above, Hilbert had outlined an idea for a consistency proof
for systems involving ε-terms already in early 1922 (Hilbert, 1922a), and
a little more precisely in his talk of 1922 (Hilbert, 1923) and in the 1922–
23 lectures (Hilbert and Bernays, 1923a). Let us review the Ansatz in the
notation used in 1924: Suppose a proof involves only one ε term εaA(a) and
corresponding critical formulas
A(ki)→ A(εaA(a)),
i.e., substitution instances of the transfinite axiom
A(a)→ A(εaA(a)).
We replace εaA(a) everywhere with 0, and transform the proof as before
by rewriting it in tree form (“dissolution into proof threads”), eliminating
free variables and evaluating numerical terms involving primitive recursive
functions. Then the critical formulas take the form
A(zi)→ A(0),
where zi is the numerical term to which ki reduces. A critical formula can
now only be false if A(zi) is true and A(0) is false. If that is the case, repeat
the procedure, now substituting zi for εaA(a). This yields a proof in which all
initial formulas are correct and no ε terms occur.
If critical formulas of the second kind, i.e., substitution instances of the
induction axiom,
εaA(a) 6= 0 → A(δεaA(a)),
also appear in the proof, the witness z has to be replaced with the least z′ so
that A(z′) is true.
The challenge was to extend this procedure to (a) cover more than one
ε-term in the proof, (b) take care of nested ε-terms, and lastly (c) extend it
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to second-order ε’s and terms involving them, i.e, ε fAa( f (a)). This is what
Ackermann set out to do in the last part of his dissertation, and what he and
Hilbert thought he had accomplished.42
The system for which Ackermann attempted to give a consistency proof
consisted of the system of second-order primitive recursive arithemtic (see
Section 3.1 above) together with the transfinite axioms:
1. A(a)→ A(εaA(a)) Aa f (a)→ Aa((ε f Ab( f (b)))(a))
2. A(εaA(a))→ piaA(a) = 0 Aa(ε f Ab( f (b))(a))→ pi f Aa( f (a)) = 0
3. A(εaA(a))→ piaA(a) = 1 Aa(ε f Ab( f (b))(a))→ pi f Aa( f (a)) = 1
4. εaA(a) 6= 0 → A(δ(εaA(a)))43
The intuitive interpretation of ε and pi, based on these axioms, is obvious:
εaA(a) is a witness for A(a) if one exists, and piaA(a) = 1 if A(a) is false
for all a, and = 0 otherwise. The pi functions are not necessary for the de-
velopment of mathematics in the axiom system. They do, however, serve a
function in the consistency proof, viz., to keep track of whether a value of 0
for εaA(a) is a “default value” (i.e., a trial substitution for which A(a) may or
may not be true) or an actual witness (a value for which A(a) has been found
to be true).
I shall now attempt to give an outline of the ε-substitution procedure de-
fined by Ackermann. For simplicity, I will leave the case of second-order
ε-terms (i.e., those involving ε f ) to the side.
An ε-term is an expression of the form εaA(a), where a is the only free
variable in A, and similarly for a pi-term. For the purposes of the discussion
below, we will not specifically refer to pi’s unless necessary, and most defini-
tions and operations apply equally to ε-terms and pi-terms. If a formula A(a)
or an ε-term εaA(a) contains no variable-free subterms which are not numer-
als, we call them canonical. Canonical formulas and ε-terms are indicated by
a tilde: εa ˜A(a).
The main notion in Ackermann’s proof is that of a total substitution S
(Gesamtersetzung). It is a mapping of canonical ε- and pi-terms to numerals
and 0 or 1, respectively. When canonical ε-terms in a proof are successively
replaced by their values under the mapping, a total substitution reduces the
proof to one not containing any ε’s. If S maps εa ˜A(a) to z and pia ˜A(a) to i, then
we say that ˜A(a) receives a (z, i) substitution under S and write S( ˜A(a)) =
(z, i).
It is of course not enough to define a mapping from the canonical ε-terms
occuring in the proof to numerals: The proof may contain, e.g., εaA(a,ϕ(εbB(b))).
To reduce this to a numeral, we first need a value z for the term εbB(b).
Replacing εbB(b) by z, we obtain εaA(a,ϕ(z)). Suppose the value ϕ(z) is z′.
The total substitution then also has to specify a substitution for εaA(a,z′).
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Given a total substitution S, a proof is reduced to an ε-free proof as fol-
lows: First all ε-free terms are evaluated. (Such terms contain only numerals
and primitive recursive functions; these are computed and the term replaced
by the numeral corresponding to the value of the term) Now let e11, e12,
. . . be all the innermost (canonical) ε- or pi-terms in the proof, i.e., all ε-
or pi-terms which do not themselves contain nested ε- or pi-terms or con-
stant (variable-fee) subterms which are not numerals. The total substitution
specifies a numeral substitution for each of these. Replace each e1i by its
corresponding numeral. Repeat the procedure until the only remaining terms
are numerals. We write |e|S for the result of applying this procedure to the
expression (formula or term) e. Note that |e|S is canonical.
Based on this reduction procedure, Ackermann defines a notion of subor-
dination of canonical formulas. Roughly, a formula ˜B(b) is subordinate to
˜A(a) if in the process of reducing some formula ˜A(z), an ε-term εb ˜B(b) is
replaced by a numeral. For instance, a = b is subordinate to a = εb(a = b).
Indeed, if ˜A(a) is a = εb(a = b), then the reduction of ˜A(z) ≡ z = εb(z = b)
would use a replacement for the ε-term belonging to ˜B(z= b).44 It is easy to
see that this definition corresponds to the notion of subordination as defined
in Hilbert and Bernays (1939). An ε-expression is an expression of the form
εaA(a). If εaA(a) contains no free variables, it is called an ε-term. If an ε-
term εbB(b) occurs in an expression (and is different from it), it is said to be
nested in it. If an ε-expression εbB(a,b) occurs in an expression in the scope
of εa, then it is subordinate to that expression. Accordingly, we can define
the degree of an ε-term and the rank of an ε-expression as follows: An ε-term
with no nested ε-subterms is of degree 1; otherwise its degree is the maximum
of the degrees of its nested ε-subterms +1. The rank of an ε-expression with
no subordinate ε-expressions is 1; otherwise it is the maximum of the ranks
of its subordinate ε-expressions +1. If ˜B(b) is subordinate to ˜A(a) according
to Ackermann’s definition, then εb ˜B(b) is subordinate in the usual sense to
εa ˜A(a), and the rank of εb ˜B(b) is less than that of εa ˜A(a). The notion of de-
gree corresponds to an ordering of canonical formulas used for the reduction
according to a total substitution in Ackermann’s procedural definition: First
all ε-terms of degree 1 (i.e., all innermost ε-terms) are replaced, resulting
(after evaluation of primitive recursive functions) in a partially reduced proof.
The formulas corresponding to innermost ε-terms now are reducts of ε-terms
of degree 2 in the original proof. The canonical formulas corresponding to
ε-terms of degree 1 are called the formulas of level 1, the canonical formulas
corresponing to the innermost ε-terms in the results of the first reduction step
are the formulas of level 2, and so forth.
The consistency proof proceeds by constructing a sequence S1, S2, . . . of
total substitutions together with bookkeeping functions fi( ˜A(a), j)→{0,1},45
which eventually results in a solving substitution, i.e., a total substitution
which reduces the proof to one which contains only correct ε-free formulas.
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We begin with a total substitution S1 which assigns (0,1) to all canonical
formulas, and set f1( ˜A(a),1) = 1 for all ˜A(a) for which S1 assigns a value. If
Si is a solving substitution, the procedure terminates. Otherwise, the next total
substitution Si+1 is obtained as follows: If Si is not a solving substitution, at
least one of the critical formulas in the proof reduces to an incorrect formula.
We have three cases:
1. Either an ε-axiom A(a) → A(εaA(a)) or a pi-axiom of the first kind
A(εaA(a))→ piaA(a) = 0 reduces to a false formula of the form ˜A(z)→
˜A(0) or ˜A(0) → 1 = 0, and Si( ˜A(a)) = (0,1). Pick one such ˜A(a) of
lowest level (i.e., εaA(a) of lowest degree).
If ˜A(0) → 1 = 0 is incorrect, ˜A(0) must be correct; let Si+1( ˜A(a)) =
(0,0). Otherwise ˜A(z)→ ˜A(0) is incorrect and hence ˜A(z) must be cor-
rect; then let Si+1( ˜A(a)) = (z,0). In either case, set fi+1( ˜A(a), i+ 1) =
1.
For other formulas ˜B(b), Si+1( ˜B(b)) = S j( ˜B(b)) where j is the greatest
index ≤ i such that fi( ˜B(b), j) = 1. Si+1( ˜B(b)) = (0,1) if no such j ex-
ists (i.e., ˜B(b) has never before received an example substitution). Also,
let fi+1( ˜B(b), i+1)= 1. For all canonical formulas ˜C(c), let fi+1( ˜C(c), j)=
fi( ˜C(c), j) for j ≤ i.
2. Case (1) does not apply, but at least one of the minimality axioms εaA(a) 6=
0 → A(δ(εaA(a)) reduces to a false formula, z 6= 0 → ˜A(z− 1). This is
only possible if Si( ˜A(a)) = (z,0). Again, pick the one of lowest level,
and let Si+1( ˜A(a)) = (z− 1,0) and fi+1( ˜A(a), i+ 1) = 1. Substitutions
for other formulas and bookkeeping functions are defined as in case (1).
3. Neither case (1) nor (2) applies, but some instance of an ε-axiom of
the form A(a)→ A(εaA(a)) or of a pi-axiom of the form A(εaA(a))→
piaA(a) = 1, e.g., ˜A(a)→ ˜A(z)) or ˜A(z)→ 0 = 1, reduces to an incorrect
formula. We then have Si( ˜A(a)) = (z,0) (since otherwise case (1) would
apply). In either case, | ˜A(z))|Si must be incorrect. Let j be the least index
where S j( ˜A(a)) = (z,0) and fi( ˜A(a)), j) = 1. At the preceding total sub-
stitution S j−1, S j( ˜A(a)) = (0,1) or S j−1(A(a)) = (z+1,0), and |A(z)|S j−1
is correct. ˜A(z) thus must reduce to different formulas under S j−1 and
under Si, which is only possible if a formula subordinate to ˜A reduces
differently under S j−1 and Si.
For example, suppose ˜A(a) is really ˜A(a,εb ˜B(a,b)). Then the corre-
sponding ε-axiom would be
˜A(a,εb ˜B(a,b))→ ˜A(εa ˜A(a,εb ˜B(a,b))︸ ︷︷ ︸
εa ˜A(a)
,εb ˜B(εa ˜A(a,εb ˜B(a,b))︸ ︷︷ ︸
εa ˜A(a)
,b))
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An instance thereof would be
˜A(a,εb ˜B(a,b)→ ˜A(εa ˜A(a,εb ˜B(a,b)),εb ˜B(εa ˜A(a,εb ˜B(a,b)),b)).
This formula, under a total substitution with Si( ˜A(a,εb ˜B(a,b))) = (z,0)
reduces to
˜A(a,εb ˜B(a,b)→ ˜A(z,εb ˜B(z,b))
The consequent of this conditional, i.e., ˜A(z), can reduce to different for-
mulas under Si and S j−1 only if εb ˜B(z,b) receives different substitutions
under Si and S j−1, and ˜B(a,b) is subordinate to ˜A(a).
The next substitution is now defined as follows: Pick an innermost for-
mula subordinate to ˜A(a) which changes substitutions, say ˜B(b). For
all formulas ˜C(c) which are subordinate to ˜B(b) as well as ˜B(b) itself,
we set fi+1( ˜C(c),k) = 1 for j ≤ k ≤ i+ 1 and fi+1( ˜C(c),k) = 0 for all
other formulas. For k < j we set fi+1( ˜C(c),n) = fi( ˜C(c),k) for all ˜C(c).
The next substitution Si+1 is now given by Si+1( ˜C(c)) = Sk( ˜C(c)) for k
greatest such that fi+1( ˜C(c),k) = 1 or = (0,1) if no such k exists.
Readers familiar with the substitution method defined in Ackermann (1940)
will note the following differences:
a. Ackermann (1940) uses the notion of a type of an ε-term and instead of
defining total substitutions in terms of numeral substitutions for canonical
ε-terms, assigns a function of finite support to ε-types. This change is
merely a notational convenience, as these functional substitutions can
be recovered from the numeral substitutions for canonical ε-terms. For
example, if S assigns the substitutions to the canonical terms on the left,
then a total substitution in the sense of Ackermann (1940) would assign
the function g on the right to the type εa ˜A(a,b):
S( ˜A(a,z1) = z′1 g(εa ˜A(a,b))(z1) = z′1
S( ˜A(a,z3) = z′2 g(εa ˜A(a,b))(z2) = z′2
S( ˜A(a,z2) = z′3 g(εa ˜A(a,b))(z3) = z′3
b. In case (2), dealing with the least number (induction) axiom, the next sub-
stitution is defined by reducing the substituted numeral z by 1, whereas
in (Ackermann, 1940), we immediately proceed to the least z′ such that
˜A(z′) is correct. This makes the procedure converge more slowly, but also
suggests that in certain cases (depending on which other critical formulas
occur in the proof), the solving substitution does not necessarily provide
example substitutions which are, in fact, least witnesses.
c. The main difference in the method lies in case (3). Whereas in (1940), ex-
ample substitutions for all ε-types of rank lower than that of the changed
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εa ˜A(a) are retained, and all others are reset to initial substitutions (func-
tions constant equal to 0), in (1924b), only the substitutions of some
ε-terms actually subordinate to εa ˜A(a) are retained, while others are not
reset to initial substitutions, but to substitutions defined at some previous
stage.
3.5. ASSESSMENT AND COMPLICATIONS
A detailed analysis of the method and of the termination proof given in the last
part of Ackermann’s dissertation must wait for another occasion, if only for
lack of space. A preliminary assessment can, however, already be made on the
basis of the outline of the substitution process above. Modulo some needed
clarification in the definitions, the process is well-defined and terminates at
least for proofs containing only least-number axioms (critical formulas cor-
responding to axiom (4)) of rank 1. The proof that the procedure terminates
(§9 of Ackermann (1924b)) is opaque, especially in comparison to the proof
by transfinite induction for primitive recursive arithmetic. The definition of a
substitution method for second-order ε-terms is insufficient, and in hindsight
it is clear that a correct termination proof for this part could not have been
given with the methods available.46
Leaving aside, for the time being, the issue of what was actually proved
in Ackermann (1924b), the question remains of what was believed to have
been proved at the time. The system, as given in (1924b), had two major
shortcomings: A footnote, added in proof, states:
[The formation of ε-terms] is restricted in that a function variable f (a)
may not be substituted by a functional a(a), in which a occurs in the
scope of an ε f .47
This applies in particular to the second-order ε-axioms
Aa( f (a))→ Aa(ε f Ab( f (b))(a)).
If we view ε f Ab( f (b))(a) as the function “defined by” A, and hence the ε-
axiom as the ε-calculus analog of the comprehension axiom, this amounts
roughly to a restriction to arithmetic comprehension, and thus a predicative
system. This shortcoming, and the fact that the restriction turns the system
into a system of predicative mathematics was pointed out by von Neumann
(1927).
A second lacunae was the omission of an axiom of ε-extensionality for
second-order ε-terms, i.e.,
(∀ f )(A( f )⇋ B( f ))→ ε f A( f ) = ε f B( f ),
which corresponds to the axiom of choice. Both problems were the subject
of correspondence with Bernays in 1925.48 A year later, Ackermann is still
trying to extend and correct the proof, now using ε-types:
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I am currently working again on the ε f -proof and am pushing hard to
finish it. I have already told you that the problem can be reduced to
one of number theory. To prove the number-theoretic theorem seems to
me, however, equally hard as the problem itself. I am now again taking
the approach, which I have tried several times previously, to extend the
definition of a ground type so that even ε with free function variables
receive a substitution. This approach seems to me the most natural, and
the equality axioms ( f )(A( f )⇋B( f ))→ ε f A f ≡ ε f B f would be treated
simultaneously. I am hopeful that the obstacles previously encountered
with this method can be avoided, if I use the εa formalism and use sub-
stitutions for the ε f which may contain εa instead of functions defined
without ε. I have, however, only thought through some simple special
cases.49
In 1927, Ackermann developed a second proof of ε-substitution, using some
of von Neumann’s ideas (in particular, the notion of an ε-type, Grundtyp).
The proof is unfortunately not preserved in its entirety, but references to it
can be found in the correspondence. On April 12, 1927, Bernays writes to
Ackermann:
Finally I have thought through your newer proof for consistency of the
εa’s based on what you have written down for me befor your departure,
and believe that I have seen the proof to be correct.50
Ackermann also refers to the proof in a letter to Hilbert from 1933:
As you may recall, I had at the time a second proof for the consis-
tency of the εa’s. I never published that proof, but communicated it to
Prof. Bernays orally, who then verified it. Prof. Bernays wrote to me
last year that the result does not seem to harmonize with the work of
Go¨del.51
In Hilbert’s address to the International Congress of Mathematicians in 1928
(Hilbert, 1928), the success of Ackermann’s and von Neumann’s work on ε-
substitution for first-order systems is also taken for granted. Although Hilbert
poses the extension of the proof to second-order systems as an open problem,
there seems no doubt in his mind that the solution is just around the corner.52
It might be worthwhile to mention at this point that at roughly the same
time a third attempt to find a satisfactory consistency proof was made. This at-
tempt was based not on ε-substituion, but on Hilbert’s so-called unsuccessful
proof (verunglu¨ckter Beweis).
While working on the Grundlagenbuch, I found myself motivated to re-
think Hilbert’s second consistency proof for the ε-axiom, the so-called
“unsuccessful” proof, and it now seems to me that it can be fixed after
all.53
This proof bears a striking resemblance to the proof the first ε-theorem in
(Hilbert and Bernays, 1939) and to a seven-page sketch in Bernays’s hand of a
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“consistency proof for the logical axiom of choice” found bound with lecture
notes to Hilbert’s course on “Elements and principles of mathematics” of
1910.54 This “unsuccessful” proof seems to me to be another but independent
contribution to the development of logic and the ε-calculus, independent of
the substituion method. Note that Bernays’s proof of Herbrand’s theorem in
(Hilbert and Bernays, 1939) is based on the (second) ε-theorem is the first
correct published proof of that important result.
The realization that the consistency proof even for first-order ε’s was prob-
lematic came only with Go¨del’s incompleteness results. In a letter dated March 10,
1931, von Neumann presents an example that shows that in the most recent
version of Ackermann’s proof, the length of the substitution process not only
depends on the rank and degree of ε-terms occurring in the proof, but also on
numerical values used as substitutions. He concludes:
I think that this answers the question, which we recently discussed when
going through Ackermann’s modified proof, namely whether an estimate
of the length of the correction process can be made uniformly and inde-
pendently of numerical substituends, in the negative. At this point the
proof of termination of the procedure (for the next higher degree, i.e., 3)
has a gap.55
There is no doubt that the discussion of the consistency proof was precip-
itated by Go¨del’s results, as both von Neumann and Bernays were aware of
these results, and at least von Neumann realized the implications for Hilbert’s
Program and the prospects of a finitistic consistency proof for arithmetic.
Bernays corresponded with Go¨del on the relevance of Go¨del’s result for the
viability of the project of consistency proofs just before and after von Neu-
mann’s counterexample located the difficulty in Ackermann’s proof. On Jan-
uary 18, 1931, Bernays writes to Go¨del:
If one, as does von Neumann, assumes as certain that any finite consid-
eration can be formulated in the framework of System P—I think, as you
do too, that this is not at all obvious—one arrives at the conclusion that
a finite proof of consistency of P is impossible.
The puzzle, however, remained unresolved for Bernays even after von Neu-
mann’s example, as he writes to Go¨del just after the exchange with von
Neumann, on April 20, 1931:
The confusion here is probably connected to that about Ackermann’s
proof for the consistency of number theory (System Z), which I have not
so far been able to clarify.
That proof—on which Hilbert has reported in his Hamburg talk on
the “foundations of mathematics”56 [. . . ]—I have repeatedly thought
through and found correct. On the basis of your results one must now
conclude that this proof cannot be formalized within System Z; indeed,
this must hold even if one restricts the system whose consistency is
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to be proved by leaving only addition and multiplication as recursive
definitions. On the other hand, I do not see which part of Ackermann’s
proof makes the formalization within Z impossible, in particular if the
problem is so restricted.57
Go¨del’s results thus led Bernays, and later Ackermann to reexamine the meth-
ods used in the consistency proofs. A completion of the project had to wait
until 1940, when Ackermann was able to carry through the termination proof
based on transfinite induction—following Gentzen (1936)—on ε0.
4. Conclusion
With the preceding exposition and analysis of the development of axiomatiza-
tions of logic and mathematics and of Hilbert and Ackermann’s consistency
proofs I hope to have answered some open questions regarding the historical
development of Hilbert’s Program. Hilbert’s technical project and its evolu-
tion is without doubt of tremendous importance to the history of logic and the
foundations of mathematics in the 20th century. Moreover, an understanding
of the technical developments can help to inform an understanding of the
history and prospects of the philosophical project. The lessons drawn in the
discussion, in particular, of Ackermann’s use of transfinite induction, raise
more questions. The fact that transfinite induction in the form used by Acker-
mann was so readily accepted as finitist, not just by Ackermann himself, but
also by Hilbert and Bernays leaves open two possibilities: either they were
simply wrong in taking the finitistic nature of Ackermann’s proof for granted
and the use of transfinite induction simply cannot be reconciled with the fini-
tist standpoint as characterized by Hilbert and Bernays in other writings, or
the common view of what Hilbert thought the finitist standpoint to consist in
must be revised. Specifically, it seems that the explanation of why transfinite
induction is acceptable stresses one aspect of finitism while downplaying
another: the objects of finitist reasoning are—finite and—intuitively given,
whereas the methods of proof were not required to have the epistemic strength
that the finitist standpoint is usually thought to require (i.e., to guarantee, in
one sense or another, the intuitive evidence of the resulting theorems). Of
course, the question of whether Hilbert can make good on his claims that
finitistic reasoning affords this intutive evidence of its theorems is one of the
main difficulties in a philosphical assessment of the project (see, e.g., Parsons
(1998)).
I have already hinted at the implications of a study of the practice of
finitism for philosophical reconstructions of the finitist view (in note 4). We
are of course free to latch on to this or that aspect of Hilbert’s ideas (finitude,
intuitive evidence, or surveyability) and develop a philosophical view around
it. Such an approach can be very fruitful, and have important and inightful
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results (as, e.g, the example of Tait’s (1981) work shows). The question is to
what extent such a view should be accepted as a reconstruction of Hilbert’s
view as long as it makes the practice of the technical project come out off
base. Surely rational reconstruction is governed by something like a principle
of charity. Hilbert and his students, to the extent possible, should be construed
so that what they preached is reflected in their practice. This requires, of
course, that we know what the practice was. If nothing else, I hope to have
provided some of the necessary data for that.
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Notes
1 Hilbert (1905, 131). For a general discussion of Hilbert’s views around 1905, see Peck-
haus (1990, Chapter 3).
2
”
Die von ZERMELO benutze axiomatische Methode ist zwar unanfechtbar und unentbehrlich.
Es bleibt dabei doch die Frage offen, ob die aufgestellten Axiome nicht etwa einen Widerspruch
einschliessen. Ferner erhebt sich die Frage, ob und inwieweit sich das Axiomensystem aus der
Logik ableiten la¨sst. [. . . D]er Versuch einer Zuru¨ckfu¨hrung auf die Logik scheint besonders
deshalb aussichtsvoll, weil zwischen Mengen, welche ja die Gegensta¨nde in ZERMELOs Axiomatik
bilden, und den Pra¨dikaten der Logik ein enger Zusammenhang besteht. Na¨mlich die Mengen
lassen sich auf Pra¨dikate zuru¨ckfu¨hren.
Diesen Gedanken haben FREGE, RUSSEL[L] und WEYL zum Ausgangspunkt genommen
bei ihren Untersuchungen u¨ber die Grundlagen der Mathematik.“ (Hilbert 1920, 27–28).
3
”
Wir mu¨ssen uns na¨mlich fragen, was es bedeuten soll:
”
es gibt ein Pra¨dikat P.“ In der
axiomatischen Mengentheorie bezieht sich das
”
es gibt“ immer auf den zugrunde gelegten
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BereichB. In der Logik ko¨nnen wir zwar auch die Pra¨dikate zu einem Bereich zusammengefasst
denken; aber dieser Bereich der Pra¨dikate kann hier nicht als etwas von vorneherein Gegebenes
betrachtet werden, sondern die Pra¨dikate mu¨ssen durch logische Operationen gebildet werden,
und durch die Regeln der Konstruktion bestimmt sich erst nachtra¨glich der Pra¨dikaten-Bereich.
Hiernach ist ersichtlich, dass bei den Regeln der logischen Konstruktion von Pra¨dikaten
die Bezugnahme auf den Pra¨dikaten-Bereich nicht zugelassen werden kann. Denn sonst erga¨be
sich ein circulus vitiosus.“ (Hilbert 1920, 31).
4
“RUSSELL geht von dem Gedanken aus, dass es genu¨gt, das zur Definition der Vereinigungsmenge
unbrauchbare Pra¨dikat durch ein sachlich gleichbedeutendes zu ersetzen, welches nicht dem
gleichen Einwande unterliegt. Allerdings vermag er ein solches Pra¨dikat nicht anzugeben, aber
er sieht es als ausgemacht an, dass ein solches existiert. In diesem Sinne stellt er sein
”
Axiom
der Reduzierbarkeit“ auf, welches ungefa¨hr folgendes besagt:
”
Zu jedem Pra¨dikat, welches
durch (ein- oder mehrmalige) Bezugnahme auf den Pra¨dikatenbereich gebildet ist, gibt es ein
sachlich gleichbedeutendes Pra¨dikat, welches keine solche Bezugnahme aufweist.
Hiermit kehrt aber RUSSELL von der konstruktiven Logik zu dem axiomatischen Standpunkt
zuru¨ck. [. . . ]
Das Ziel, die Mengenlehre und damit die gebra¨uchlichen Methoden der Analysis auf die
Logik zuru¨ckzufu¨hren, ist heute nicht erreicht und ist vielleicht u¨berhaupt nicht erreichbar.”
(Hilbert 1920, 32–33).
5
“. . . zur Vermeidung von Paradoxien ist daher eine teilweise gleichzeitige Entwicklung
der Gesetze der Logik und der Arithmetik erforderlich.” (Hilbert 1905, 176).
6
“In Anbetracht der grossen Mannigfaltigkeit von Verknu¨pfungen und Zusammenha¨ngen,
welche die Arithmetik aufweist, ist es von vornherein ersichtlich, dass wir die Aufgabe des
Nachweises der Widerspruchslosigkeit nicht mit einem Schlage lo¨sen ko¨nnen. Wir werden
vielmehr so vorgehen, dass wir zuna¨chst nur die einfachsten Verknu¨pfungen betrachten und
dann schrittweise immer ho¨here Operationen und Schlussweisen hinzunehmen, wobei dann
fu¨r jede Erweiterung des Systems der Zeichen und der Uebergangsformeln einzeln der Nachweis
zu erbringen ist, dass sie die auf der vorherigen Stufe festgestellte Widerspruchsfreiheit nicht
aufheben.
Ein weiterer wesentlicher Gesichtspunkt ist, dass wir, gema¨ss unserem Plan der restlosen
Formalisierung der Arithmetik, den eigentlich mathematischen Formalismus im Zusammenhang
mit dem Formalismus der logischen Operationen entwickeln mu¨ssen, sodass—wie ich es
ausgedru¨ckt habe—ein simultaner Aufbau von Mathematik und Logik ausgefu¨hrt wird.”, (Hilbert 1922b,
8a–9a). The passage is not contained in Kneser’s notes (Hilbert and Bernays, 1923a) to the
same course.
7 The notes by Kneser (Hilbert and Bernays, 1923a) do not contain the list of systems
below. The version of the ε-calculus used in the addendum is the same as that used in Kneser’s
notes, and differs from the presentation in Ackermann (1924b), submitted February 20, 1924.
8 (Hilbert and Bernays, 1923b), 17, 19
9
“Disposition. Stufe II war elementares Rechnen Axiome 1–16
Stufe III. Nun elementare Zahlentheorie
Schema fu¨r Def. von Funktionen durch Rekursion u. Schlussschema
wollen [?] unser Schlussschema noch das Induktionsschema hinzuziehen
Wenn auch inhaltlich das wesentlich mit den Ergebnissen der anschauliche gewonnenen [?]
Zahlenth. u¨bereinstimmt, so doch jetzt Formeln z.B. a+b = b+a.
Stufe IIII. Transfinite Schlussweise u. teilweise Analysis
Stufe V. Ho¨here Variablen-Gattungen u. Mengenlehre. Auswahlaxiom
Stufe VI. Zahlen d[er] 2ten Zahlkl[asse], Volle transfin[ite] Induktion. Ho¨here Typen.
Continuumsproblem, transfin[ite] Induktion fu¨r Zahlen der 2ten Zahlkl.
conprf.tex; 21/03/2018; 17:29; p.35
36
Stufe VII. 1.) Ersetzung der ∞ vielen Definitionsschemata durch ein Axiom. 2.) Analysis
u[nd] Mengenlehre. Auf der 4ten Stufe nochmals der volle Satz von der oberen Grenze
Stufe VIII. Formalisierung der Wohlordnung. ” (Hilbert and Bernays, 1923a), Erga¨nzung,
sheet 1.
10 The proof can also be found in Hilbert (1922c, 171–173); cf. Mancosu (1998, 208–210).
11
“Somit sehen wir uns veranlasst, die Beweise als solche zum Gegenstand der Untersuchung
zu machen; wir werden zu einer Art von Beweistheorie gedra¨ngt, welche mit den Beweisen
selbst als Gegensta¨nden operiert.
Fu¨r die Denkweise der gewo¨hnlichen Zahlentheorie sind die Zahlen das gegensta¨ndlich-
Aufweisbare, und die Beweise der Sa¨tze u¨ber die Zahlen fallen schon in das gedankliche
Gebiet. Bei unserer Untersuchung ist der Beweis sebst etwas Aufweisbares, und durch das
Denken u¨ber den Beweis kommen wir zur Lo¨sung unseres Problems.
Wie der Physiker seinen Apparat, der Astronom seinen Standort untersuch, wie der Philosoph
Vernunft-Kritik u¨bt, so braucht der Mathematiker diese Beweistheorie, um jeden mathematischen
Satz durch eine Beweis-Kritik sicherstellen zu ko¨nnen.” Hilbert (1920, 39–40). Almost the
same passage is found in Hilbert (1922c, 169–170), cf. Mancosu (1998, 208).
12 For a detailed discussion of these influences, see Mancosu (1999a).
13 (Hilbert 1922b, part 2, 3). Kneser’s Mitschrift of these lectures contains a different system
which does not include negation. Instead, numerical inequality is a primitive. This system is
also found in Hilbert’s first talks on the subject in Copenhagen and Hamburg in Spring and
Summer of 1921. Hilbert (1923), a talk given in September 1922, and Kneser’s notes to the
course of Winter Semester 1922–23 (Hilbert and Bernays, 1923b) do contain the new system
with negation. This suggests that the developments of Hilbert’s 1921–22 lectures were not
incorporated into the published version of Hilbert’s Hamburg talk (1922c). Although (1922c)
was published in 1922, and a footnote to the title says “This communication is essentially the
content of the talks which I have given in the Spring of this year in Copenhagen [. . . ] and
in the Summer in Hamburg [. . . ],” it is clear that the year in question is 1921, when Hilbert
addressed the Mathematisches Seminar of the University of Hamburg, July 25–27, 1921. A
report of the talks was published by Reidemeister in Jahrbuch der Deutschen Mathematiker-
Vereinigung 30, 2. Abt. (1921), 106. Hilbert and Bernays (1923b) also have separate axioms
for conjunction and disjunction, while in (1923) it is extended it by quantifiers.
14 The procedure whereby we pass from A to A′ is simple in this case, provided we keep
track of which variables are substituted for below the inference. In general, the problem of
deciding whether a formula is a substitution instance of another, and to calculate the substitu-
tion which would make the latter syntactically identical to the former is known as matching.
Although not computationally difficult, it is not entirely trivial either.
15
“Nennen wir eine Formel, in der keine Variablen und keine Funktionale ausser Zahlzeichen
vorkommen, eine
”
explizite [numerische] Formel“, so ko¨nnen wir das gefundene Ergebnis so
aussprechen: Jede beweisbare explizite [numerische] Formel ist Endformel eines Beweises,
dessen sa¨mtliche Formeln explizite Formeln sind.
Dieses mu¨sste insbesondere von der Formel 0 6= 0 gelten, wenn sie beweisbar wa¨re. Der
verlangte Nachweis der Widerspruchsfreiheit ist daher erbracht, wenn wir zeigen, dass es
keinen Beweis der Formel geben kann, der aus lauter expliziten Formeln besteht.
Um diese Unmo¨glichkeit einzusehen, genu¨gt es, eine konkret feststellbare Eigenschaft zu
finden, die erstens allen den expliziten Formeln zukommt, welche durch Einsetzung aus einem
Axiom entstehen, die ferner bei einem Schluss sich von den Pra¨missen auf die Endformel
u¨bertra¨gt, die dagegen nicht auf die Formel 0 6= 0 zutrifft.” (Hilbert 1922b, part 2, 27–28).
16
“Wir teilen die expliziten Formeln in
”
richtige“ und
”
falsche“ ein. Die expliziten Primformeln
sind Gleichungen, auf deren beiden Seiten Zahlzeichen stehen. Eine solche Gleichung nennen
wir richtig, wenn die beiderseits stehenden Zahlzeichen u¨bereinstimmen; andernfalls nennen
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wir sie falsch. Eine Ungleichung, auf deren beiden Seiten Zahlzeichen stehen, nennen wir
richtig, falls die beiden Zahlzeichen verschieden sind; sonst nen[n]en wir sie falsch.
In der Normalform einer beliebigen expliziten Formel haben alle Disjunktionsglieder die
Gestalt von Gleichungen oder Ungleichungen, auf deren beiden Sieten Zahlzeichen stehen.
Wir nennen nun eine allgemeine explizite Formel richtig, wenn in der zugeho¨rigen Normalform
jede als Konjunktionsglied auftretende (bezw. die ganze Normalform ausmachende) Disjunktion
eine richtige Gleichung oder eine richtige Ungleichung als Glied entha¨lt. Andernfalls nennen
wir die Formel falsch. [. . . ]
Nach der gegebenen Definition la¨sst sich die Frage, ob eine explizierte [sic] Formel richtig
oder falsch ist, in jed[e]m Falle konkret entscheiden. Hier gilt also das
”
tertium non datur“
[. . . ]” (Hilbert 1922b, part 2, 33).
17 Hilbert (1918b, 149-150). See also Zach (1999, §2.3).
18 A sketch of the consistency proof is found in the Kneser Mitschrift to the 1921–22 lectures
(Hilbert, 1922a) in Heft II, pp. 23–32 and in the official notes by Bernays (Hilbert 1922b,
part 2, 19–38). The earlier Kneser Mitschrift leaves out step (1), and instead of eliminat-
ing variables introduces the notion of einsetzungsrichtig (correctness under substitution, i.e.,
every substitution instance is correct). These problems were avoided in the official Bernays
typescript. The Kneser notes did contain a discussion of recursive definition and induction,
which is not included in the official notes; more about these in the next section.
19 In the 1921–22 lectures, it is initially argued that the result of applying transformations
(1)–(3) results in a proof of the same end formula (if substitutions are added to the initial
formulas). Specifically, it is suggested that the result of applying elimination of variables and
reduction of functionals to the axioms results in formulas which are substitution instances of
axioms. It was quickly realized that this is not the case. (When Bernays presented the proof in
the 1922–23 lectures on December 14, 1922, he comments that the result of the transformation
need not be a proof (Hilbert and Bernays 1923b, 21). The problem is the axiom of equality
a = b → (A(a)→ A(b)).
Taking A(c) to be δ(c) = c, a substitution instance would be
0+1+1 = 0 → (δ(0+1+1) = 0+1+1 → δ(0) = 0)
This reduces to
0+1+1 = 0 → (0+1 = 0+1+1 → 0 = 0)
which is not a substitution instance of the equality axiom. The consistency proof itself is not
affected by this, since the resulting formula is still correct (in Hilbert’s technical sense of the
word). The official notes to the 1921–22 lectures contain a 2-page correction in Bernays’s
hand (Hilbert 1922b, part 2, between pp. 26 and 27).
20 The induction rule is not used in (Ackermann, 1924b), since he deals with stage III only
in passing and attempts a consistency proof for all of analysis. There, the induction rule is
superseded by an ε-based induction axiom. For a consistency proof of stage III alone, an
induction rule is needed, since an axiom cannot be formulated without quantifiers (or ε).
The induction rule was introduced for stage III in the Kneser notes to the 1921–22 lectures
(Hilbert, 1922a, Heft II, 32) and the 1922–23 lectures (Hilbert and Bernays, 1923b, 26). It is
not discussed in the official notes or the publications from the same period (Hilbert, 1922c;
1923
21 The general tenor, outlook, and aims of Skolem’s work are sufficiently different from
Hilbert’s to suggest there was no influence either way. Skolem states in his concluding remarks
that he wrote the paper in 1919, after reading Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica.
However, neither Hilbert nor Bernays’s papers contain an offprint or manuscript of Skolem’s
paper, nor correspondence. Skolem is not cited in any of Hilbert’s, Bernays’s, or Ackermann’s
papers of the period, although the paper is referenced in (Hilbert and Bernays, 1934).
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22
“Uns fehlt noch ganz das Ax[iom] der vollst[a¨ndigen] Induktion. Man ko¨nnte meinen, es
wa¨re
{Z(a)→ (A(a)→ A(a+1))} → {A(1)→ (Z(b)→ A(b))}
Das ist es nicht; denn man setze a = 1. Die Voraussetzung muß fu¨r alle a gelten. Wir haben
aber noch gar kein Mittel, das Alle in die Voraussetzung zu bringen. Unser Formalismus reich
noch nicht hin, das Ind.ax. aufzuschreiben.
Aber als Schema ko¨nnen wir es: Wir erweitern unsere Beweismethoden durch das nebenstehende
Schema
K(1) K(a)→ K(a+1)
Z(a)→ K(a)
Jetzt ist es vernu¨nftig, zu fragen, ob dies Schema zum Wspruch fu¨hren kann.” (Hilbert 1922a,
32). Z is the predicate expressing “is a natural number,” it disappears from later formulations
of the schema.
23
“Wie ist es bei Rekursionen? ϕ(z) komme vor. Entweder 0, dann setzten wir a dafu¨r.
Oder ϕ(z+ 1): b(z,ϕz). Beh[auptung]: Das Einsetzen kommt zu einem Abschluß, wenn wir
zu innerst anfangen.” (Hilbert and Bernays 1923a, 29)
24
“Nicht endlich (durch Rek[ursion]) definiert ist z.B. ϕ(a) = 0 wenn es ein b gibt, so
daß a5 + ab3 + 7 Primz[ahl] ist sonst = 1. Aber erst bei solchen Zahlen und Funktionen
beginnt das eigentliche math[ematische] Interesse, weil dort die Lo¨sbarkeit in endlich vielen
Schritten nicht vorauszusehen ist. Wir haben die ¨Uberzeugung, daß solche Fragen wie nach
dem Wert ϕ(a) lo¨sbar, d.h. daß ϕ(a) doch endlich definierbar ist. Darauf ko¨nnen wir aber
nicht warten: wir mu¨ssen solche Definitionen zulassen, sonst wu¨rden wir den freien Betrieb
der Wissenschaft einschra¨nken. Auch den Begriff der Funktionenfunktion brauchen wir.”
(Hilbert 1922a, Heft III, 1–2).
25 A full proof is given by Ackermann (1924b).
26
“Als erstes zeigt man, daß man alle Variablen fortschaffen kann, weil auch hier nur freie
Var[iable] vorkommen. Wir suchen die innersten τ und α. Unter diesen stehen nur endlich
definierte Funkt[ionen] ϕ, ϕ′. . . Unter diesen ko¨nnen einige im Laufe des Beweises fu¨r f in
die Ax[iome] eingesetzt sein. 1: τ(ϕ) = 0 → (Z(a→ ϕa = 1) wo a ein Funktional ist. Wenn
dies nicht benutzt wird, setze ich alle α(ϕ) und τ(ϕ) gleich Null. Sonst reduziere ich a und
ϕ(a) und sehe, ob Z(a→ ϕ(a) = 1 in allen . . . wo sie vorkommt, richtig ist. Ist die richtig, so
setze ich τ = 0 α = 0. Ist sie falsch, d.h. is a = z ϕ(z 6= 1, so setzen wir τ(ϕ) = 1, α(ϕ) = z.
Dabei bleibt der Beweis Beweis. Die an Stelle der Axiome gesetzten Formeln sind richtig.
Der Gedanke ist: wenn ein Beweis vorliegt, so kann ich aus ihm ein Argument finden fu¨r
das ϕ = 1 ist). So beseitigt man schrittweise die τ und α aund Anwendungen von 1 2 3 4 und
erha¨lt einen Beweis von 1 6= 1 aus I–V und richtigen Formeln d.h. aus I–V,
τ( f ,b) = 0 → {Z(a)→ f (a,b) = 1}
τ( f ,b) 6= 0 → Z( f (α,b))
τ( f ,b) 6= 0 → f (α( f ,b),b) 6= 1
τ( f ,b) 6= 0 → τ( f ,b) = 1”
(Hilbert, 1922a), Heft III, 3–4. The lecture is dated February 23, 1922.
27
“Was fehlt uns?
1. in logischer Hinsicht. Wir haben nur gehabt den Aussagenkalku¨l mit der Erweiterung auf
freie Variable d.h. solche fu¨r die beliebige Funktionale eingesetzt werden konnten. Es
fehlt das Operieren mit
”
alle“ und
”
es gibt“.
2. Wir haben das Induktionsschema hinzugefu¨gt, ohne W[iderspruchs]-f[reiheits] Beweis
und auch nur provisorisch, also in der Absicht, es wegzuschaffen.
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3. Bisher nur die arithmethischen Axiome genau [?] die sich auf ganze Zahlen beziehen. Und
die obigen Ma¨ngel verhindern uns ja natu¨rlich die Analysis aufzubauen (Grenzbegriff,
Irrationalzahl).
Diese 3 Punkte liefern schon Disposition und Ziele fu¨r das Folgende.
Wir wenden uns zu 1.) Es ist ja an sich klar, dass eine Logik ohne
”
alle“—
”
es gibt“
Stu¨ckwerk wa¨re, ich erinnere wie gerade in der Anwendung dieser Begriffe, und den sogennanten
transfiniten Schlussweisen die Hauptschwierigkeiten entstanden. Die Frage der Anwendbarkeit
dieser Begriffe auf ∞ Gesamtheiten haben wir noch nicht behandelt. Nun ko¨nnten wir so
verfahren, wie wir es beim Aussagen-Kalku¨l gemacht haben: einige, mo¨glichst einfache [???]
als Axiome zu formalisieren, aus denen sich [sic] dann alle u¨brigen folgen. Dann mu¨sste der
W-f Beweis gefu¨hrt werden—unserem allgem[einen] Programm gema¨ss: mit unserer Einstellung,
dass Beweis eine vorliegende Figur ist. Fu¨r den W-f Beweis grosse Schwierigkeiten wegen
der gebundenen Variabeln. Die tiefere Untersuchung zeigt aber, dass der eigentliche Kern der
Schwierigkeit an einer anderen Stelle liegt, auf die man gewo¨hnlich erst spa¨ter Acht giebt und
die auch in der Litteratur erst spa¨ter wahrgenommen worden ist.”(Hilbert and Bernays 1923b,
Erga¨nzung, sheets 3–4).
28
“[Dieser Kern liegt] beim Auswahlaxiom von Zermelo. [. . . ] Die Einwa¨nde richten sich
gegen das Auswahlprinzip. Sie mu¨ßten sich aber ebenso gegen
”
alle“ und
”
es gibt“ richten,
wobei derselbe Grundgedanke zugrunde liegt.
Wir wollen das Auswahlaxiom erweitern. Jeder Aussage mit einer Variablen A(a) ordnen
wir ein Ding zu, fu¨r das die Aussage nur dann gilt, wenn sie allgemein gilt. Also ein Gegenbeispiel,
wenn es existiert.
ε(A), eine individuelle logische Funktion. [. . . ] ε genu¨ge dem transfiniten Axiom:
(16) A(εA)→ Aa
z.B. Aa heiße: a ist bestechlich. εA ist Aristides.”(Hilbert and Bernays 1923a, 30–31). The
lecture is dated February 1, 1922, given by Hilbert. The corresponding part of Hilbert’s notes
for that lecture in (Hilbert and Bernays 1923b, Erga¨nzung, sheet 4)) contains page references
to (Hilbert 1923, 152 and 156, paras. 4–6 and 17–19 of the English translation), and indicates
the changes made for the lecture, specifically, to replace τ by ε.
29 See section 3.4 on the ε-substitution method.
30
“Wenn wir eine Funktionsvariable haben:
Aε f A f → A f
(pi fa¨llt fort)? ε komme nur mit A vor (z.B. f 0= 0, f f 0= 0). Wie werden wir die Funktionsvariablen
ausschalten? Statt f c setzen wir einfach c. Auf die gebundenen trifft das nicht zu. Fu¨r diese
nehmen wir probeweise eine bestimmte Funktion z.B. δa und fu¨hren damit die Reduktion
durch. Dann steht z.B. Aδ →Aϕ. Diese reduziert ist r[ichtig] oder f[alsch]. Im letzten Falle is
Aϕ falsch. Dann setzen wir u¨berall ϕ fu¨r ε fA f . Dann steht Aϕ→ Aψ. Das ist sicher r[ichtig]
da Aϕ f[alsch] ist.” (Hilbert and Bernays 1923a, 38–39).
31 For a more detailed survey of Ackermann’s scientific contributions, see (Hermes, 1967).
A very informative discussion of Ackermann’s scientific correspondence can be found in
(Ackermann, 1983).
32
“In seiner Arbeit “Begru¨ndung des
”
Tertium non datur“ mittels der Hilbertschen Theorie
der Widerspruchsfreiheit hat Ackermann im allgemeinsten Falle gezeigt, dass der Gebrauch
der Worte
”
alle“ und
”
es gibt“, des
”
Tertium non datur“ widerspruchsfrei ist. Der Beweis
erfolgt unter ausschliesslicher Benutzung primitiver und endlicher Schlussweisen. Es wird
alles an dem mathematischen Formalismus sozusagen direkt demonstriert.
Ackermann hat damit unter Ueberwindung erheblicher mathematischer Schwierigkeiten
ein Problem gelo¨st, das bei den modernene auf eine Neubegru¨ndung der Mathematik gerichteten
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Bestrebungen an erster Stelle steht.” Hilbert-Nachlaß, Niedersa¨chsische Staats- und Univer-
sita¨tsbibliothek Go¨ttingen, Cod. Ms. Hilbert 458, sheet 6, no date. The three-page letter was
evidently written in response to a request by the President of the International Education
Board, dated May 1, 1924.
33
“Ich bemerke nur, dass Ackermann meine Vorlesungen u¨ber die Grundlagen der Math-
[ematik] in den letzten Semestern geho¨rt hat und augenblicklich einer der besten Herren der
Theorie ist, die ich hier entwickelt habe.” ibid., sheet 2. The draft is dated March 19, 1924, and
does not mention Russell by name. Sieg (1999), however, quotes a letter from Russell’s wife to
Hilbert dated May 20, 1924, which responds to an inquiry by Hilbert concerning Ackermann’s
stay in Cambridge. Later in the letter, Hilbert expresses his regret that the addressee still has
not been able to visit Go¨ttingen. Sieg documents Hilbert’s effort in the preceding years to
effect a meeting in Go¨ttingen; it is therefore quite likely that the addressee was Russell.
34 Ackermann only requires that b be bound by the occurrence of ϕ, but this is not enough
for his proof.
35 According to Ackermann’s definition of subordination, this would not be true. A subterm
of c(b) might contain a bound variable and thus not be a constant subterm, but the variable
could be bound by a function symbol in t other than the occurrence of ϕ under consideration.
See note 4.
36 Ackermann (1924b, 18)
37 Tait (1981) argues that finitism coincides with primitive recursive arithmetic, and that
therefore the Ackermann function is not finitistic. Tait does not present this as a historical
thesis, and his conceptual analysis remains unaffected by the piece of historical evidence
presented here. For further evidence (dating however mostly from after 1931) see Zach (1998,
§5) and Tait’s response in (2000).
38 Ackermann (1924b, 13–14).
39
“[Gentzen fragt,] ob Sie der Meinung sind, dass sich die Methode des Endlichkeitsbeweises
durch transfinite Induktion auf den Wf-Beweis Ihrer Dissertation anwenden lasse. Ich wu¨rde
es sehr begru¨ssen, wenn das ginge.” Bernays to Ackermann, November 27, 1936, Bernays
Papers, ETH Zu¨rich Library/WHS, Hs 975.100.
40
“Mir fa¨llt u¨brigens jetzt, wo ich gerade meine Dissertation zur Hand nehme, auf, dass
dort in ganz a¨hnlicher Weise mit transfiniten Ordnungszahlen operiert wird wie bei Gentzen.”
Ackermann to Bernays, December 5, 1936, Bernays Papers, ETH Zu¨rich Library/WHS, Hs
975.101.
41
“Ich weiss u¨brigens nicht, ob Ihnen bekannt ist (ich hatte das seiner Zeit nicht als Ueberschreitung
des engeren finiten Standpunktes empfunden), dass in meiner Dissertation transfinite Schlu¨sse
benutzt werden. (Vgl. z.B. die Bemerkungen letzter Abschnitt Seite 13 und im na¨chstfolgenden
Abschnitt meiner Dissertation.” Ackermann to Bernays, June 29, 1938, Bernays papers, ETH-
Zu¨rich, Hs 975.114. The passage Ackermann refers to is the one quoted above.
42 The ε-substitution method was subsequently refined by von Neumann (1927) and Hilbert
and Bernays (1939). Ackermann (1940) gives a consistency proof for first-order arithmetic,
using ideas of Gentzen (1936). See also (Tait, 1965) and (Mints, 1994). Useful introductions to
the ε-substitution method of Ackermann (1940) and to the ε-notation in general can be found
in Moser (2000) and Leisenring (1969), respectively.
43 Ackermann (1924b, 8). The pi-functions were present in the earliest presentations in
(Hilbert, 1922a) as the τ-function and also occur in (Hilbert and Bernays, 1923a). They were
dropped from later presentations.
44 It is not clear whether the definition is supposed to apply to the formulas with free
variables (i.e., to a = b and a = εb(a = b) in the example) or to the corresponding substi-
tuion instances. The proof following the definition on p. 21 of (Ackermann, 1924b) suggests
the former, however, later in the procedure for defining a sequence of total substitutions it
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is suggested that the ε-expressions corresponding to formulas subordinate to ˜A(a) receive
substitutions—but according to the definition of a total substitution only ε-terms (εb(z= b) in
the example) receive substitutions.
45 The bookkeeping functions are introduced here and are not used by Ackermann. The
basic idea is that that in case (3), substitutions for some formulas are discarded, and the next
substitution is given the “last” total substitution where the substitution for the formula was
not yet marked as discarded. Instead of explicit bookkeeping, Ackermann uses the notion of a
formula being “remembered” as having its value not discarded.
46 With the restriction on second-order ε-terms imposed by Ackermann, and discussed be-
low, the system for which a consistency proof was claimed is essentially elementary analysis,
a predicative system. A consistency proof using the ε-substitution method for this system was
given by Mints and Tupailo (1996).
47 Ackermann (1924b, 9)
48 Ackermann to Bernays, June 25, 1925, Bernays Papers, ETH Zu¨rich, Hs. 975.96.
49
“Ich habe augenblicklich den ε f -Beweis wieder vorgenommen, und versuche mit aller
Gewalt da zum Abschluß zu kommen. Daß sich das Problem auf ein zahlentheoretisches
reduzieren la¨ßt, hatte ich Ihnen damals ja schon mitgeteilt. Den zahlentheoretischen Satz
allgemein zu beweisen scheint mir aber ebenso schwierig wie das ganze Problem. Ich habe nun
den schon mehrfach von mir versuchten Weg wieder eingeschlagen, den Begriff des Grundtyps
so zu erweitern, das auch die ε mit freien Funktionsvariablen eine Ersetzung bekommen.
Dieser Weg scheint ja auch der natu¨rlichste, und die Gleichheitsaxiome ( f )(A( f )⇋ B( f ))→
ε f A f ≡ ε f B f wu¨rden dann gleich mitbehandelt. Ich habe einige Hoffnung, daß die sich fru¨her
auf diesem Weg einstellenden Schwierigkeiten vermieden werden ko¨nnen, wenn ich den εa-
Formalismus benutze und statt ohne ε definierte Funktionen, solche zur Ersetzung fu¨r die ε f
nehme, die ein εa enthalten ko¨nnen. Ich habe mir aber erst einfache Spezialfa¨lle u¨berlegt.”
Ackermann to Bernays, March 31, 1926. ETH Zu¨rich/WHS, Hs 975.97. Although Acker-
mann’s mention of “ground types” precedes the publication of von Neumann (1927), the latter
paper was submitted for publication alread on July 29, 1925.
50
“Letzthin habe ich mir Ihren neueren Beweis der Widerspruchsfr[eiheit] fu¨r die εa an
Hand dessen, was Sie mir vor Ihrer Abreise aufschrieben, genauer u¨berlegt und glaube diesen
Beweis als richtig eingesehen zu haben.” Bernays to Ackermann, April 12, 1927, in the poses-
sion of Hans Richard Ackermann. Bernays continues to remark on specifics of the proof,
roughly, that when example substitutions for ε-types are revised (the situation corresponding
to case (3) in Ackermann’s original proof), the substitutions for types of higher rank have to
be reset to the initial substitution. He gives an example that shows that if this is not done, the
procedure does not terminate. He also suggests that it would be more elegant to treat all types
of the same rank at the same time and gives an improved estimate for the number of steps
necessary. Note that the reference to “εa’s” (as opposed to ε f ) suggest that the proof was only
for the first-order case. A brief sketch of the proof is also contained in a letter from Bernays
to Weyl, dated January 5, 1928 (ETH Zu¨rich/WHS, Hs. 91.10a).
51
“Wie Sie sich vielleicht erinnern, hatte ich damals einen 2. Beweis fu¨r die Widerspruchsfreiheit
der εa. Dieser Beweis ist von mir nie publiziert worden, sondern nur Herrn Prof. Bernays
mu¨ndlich mitgeteilt worden, der sich auch damals von seiner Richtigkeit u¨berzeugte. Prof.
Bernays schrieb mir nun im vergangenen Jahre, daß das Ergebnis ihm mit der Go¨delschen
Arbeit nicht zu harmonisieren scheine.” Ackermann to Hilbert, August 23, 1933, Hilbert-
Nachlaß, Niedersa¨chsische Staats- und Universita¨tsbibliothek, Cod. Ms. Hilbert 1. Ackermann
did not then locate the difficulty, and even a year and a half later (Ackermann to Bernays,
December 8, 1934, ETH Zu¨rich/WHS, Hs 975.98) suggested a way that a finitistic consistency
proof of arithmetic could be found based on work of Herbrand and Bernays’s drafts for the
second volume of Grundlagen.
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“Problem I. The consistency proof of the ε-axiom for the function variable f . We have
the outline of a proof. Ackermann has already carried it out to the extent that the only re-
maining task consists in the proof of an elementary finiteness theorem that is purely arithmeti-
cal.” Hilbert (1928), translated in Mancosu (1999a, 229). The extension to ε-extensionality is
Problem III.
53
“Anla¨sslich der Arbeit fu¨r das Grundlagenbuch sah ich mich dazu angetrieben, den zweiten
Hilbertschen Wf.-Beweis fu¨r das ε-Axiom, den sogenannten
”
verunglu¨ckten“ Beweis, nochmals
zu u¨berlegen, und es scheint mir jetzt, dass dieser sich doch richtig stellen la¨sst.” Bernays
to Ackermann, October 16, 1929, in the possession of Hans Richard Ackermann. Bernays
continues with a detailed exposition of the proof, but concludes that the proof probably cannot
be extended to include induction, for which ε-substitution seems better suited.
54 The sketch bears the title “Wf.-Beweis fu¨r das logische Auswahl-Axiom”, and is inserted
in the front of Elemente und Prinzipienfragen der Mathematik, Sommer-Semester 1910. Li-
brary of the Mathematisches Institut, Universita¨t Go¨ttingen, 16.206t14. A note in Hilbert’s
hand says “Einlage in W.S. 1920.” However, the ε-Axiom used is the more recent version
Ab→ AεaAa and not the original, dual AεaAa → Ab. It is thus very likely that the sketch dates
from after 1923.
55
“Ich glaube, dass damit die Frage, die wir bei der Durchsprechung des modifizierten
Ackermannschen Beweises zuletzt diskutierten, ob na¨mlich eine La¨ngen-Abscha¨tzung fu¨r
das Korrigier-Verfahren unabha¨ngig von der Gro¨sse der Zahlen-Substituenden gleichma¨ssig
mo¨glich sei, verneinend beantwortet ist. An diesem Punkte ist dann der Nachweis des endlichen
Abbrechens dieses Verfahrens (fu¨r den na¨chsten Grad, d.h. 3) jedenfalls lu¨ckenhaft.)” von
Neumann to Bernays, March 10, 1931, Bernays Papers, ETH Zu¨rich/WHS, Hs. 975.3328.
Von Neumann’s example can be found in Hilbert and Bernays (1939, 123).
56 Hilbert (1928).
57 In a letter dated May 3, 1931, Bernays suggests that the problem lies with certain types
of recursive definitions The Bernays–Go¨del correspondence will shortly be published in Vol-
ume IV of Go¨del’s collected works. For more on the reception of Go¨del’s results by Bernays
and von Neumann, see Dawson (1988) and Mancosu (1999b).
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